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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
This action is before the court upon a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari from an order and judgment of the Utah Court 
of Appeals entered February 2, 1990. The Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari was granted on May 21, 1990. This court has appellate 
jurisdiction over a judgment of the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether a judgment docketed against a land contract 
seller after he sells land on an installment contract is a lien 
on that land, creating an encumbrance on the buyer's interest 
therein. Because this case was decided in the district court on 
stipulated facts, this court may review the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals for correctness and examine the facts de novo. 
Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great Northern Baseball Co., 
748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
From the time the judgment of the district court or 
circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of 
the district court of the county it becomes a lien upon all real 
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in 
the county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him at the 
time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said 
lien. A transcript of judgment rendered in a district court or 
circuit court of this state, in any county thereof, may be filed 
and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court of 
any other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall have, 
for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same force and effect 
as a judgment entered in the district court in such county. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-22-1 (1977). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by Raymond P. L. Cannefax and 
Debra Cannefax ("Cannefaxes") to enjoin Donald W. Clement and 
Ruth L. Clement ("Clements") from selling Cannefaxes1 home at a 
Sheriff's execution in partial satisfaction of a judgment 
obtained by Clements against George W. Barker, Jr. and Liliam 
Barker ("Barkers"). Four years prior to Clements1 judgment being 
docketed, Barkers sold their interest in the home on contract to 
Diane Hodge ("Hodge"). Hodge later sold the home to Cannefaxes 
by Warranty Deed after Barker's judgment was docketed. Clements 
claim that since there was a balance owing on the contract when 
their judgment was docketed, the judgment constitutes a lien on 
Cannefaxes1 home to the extent of the unpaid contract. 
Based upon stipulated facts, a copy of which are 
included in the addendum, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Third 
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District Court Judge, granted Clements1 Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and ruled that their judgment constituted a lien on 
Cannefaxes1 home to the extent of the unpaid balance owed Barkers 
under the contract, less prior liens and encumbrances. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held that under 
the doctrine of equitable conversion, the seller under a real 
estate contract only has the right to receive the purchase price, 
which is personal property, and a judgment against the contract 
seller is not a lien thereon because Utah Code Ann. S 78-22-1 
(1977) only creates a lien on the judgment debtor's real prop-
erty. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and 
ordered it to enter summary judgment in favor of Cannefaxes qui-
eting title in them. Clements then petitioned the Utah Supreme 
Court for a Writ of Certiorari which was granted on May 21, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 28, 1981, Barkers owned real property located 
in Salt Lake County (the "Property"). (R. 105) On August 28, 
1981, Barkers entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with 
Hodge for the sale of the Property for $160,000.00, payable 
$40,000.00 down and the balance over a period of time with inter-
est. (R. 106) A notice of that contrapt was recorded in Salt 
Lake County on August 31, 1981. (R.106) At the time of the 
sale, there were mortgage loan obligations against the property 
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in favor of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association ("Pru-
dential") and Continental Bank and Trust Company ("Continental"). 
(R. 106) 
On August 15, 1985, Clements obtained a judgment in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court of Uintah County against the 
Barkers in the amount of $70,526.00. (R. 106) On August 19, 
1985, Clements' Judgment was docketed with the Clerk of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. (R. 106) Clements' 
Judgment against Barkers was not appealed. (R. 106) On Septem-
ber 25, 1985, immediately prior to the transaction described in 
the paragraphs which follow, Barkers held legal title to the 
Property, subject to Hodge's interest under the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. (R. 106-07) 
On September 25, 1985, Hodge owed Barkers' $87,747.40 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The prior obligations to 
Prudential and Continental totaled $33,282.50. (R. 107) On Sep-
tember 25, 1985, the Barkers gave Hodge a Warranty Deed to the 
Property. The Warranty Deed was recorded with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder on September 26, 1985. (R. 107) On September 
1
 After entering into the contract with Ms. Hodge, the 
Barkers gave quit claim deeds to the property to other people 
named Barker—presumably their children. On or before Septem-
ber 25, 1985, but prior to the other transactions of September 
25, the Barkers received back quit claim deeds to the property 
from their quit claim grantees. 
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25, 1985f at the time that Warranty Deed was delivered, Hodge 
paid the Barkers $45,000.00, and the Barkers gave Hodge a credit 
of $9,464.94. The mortgage loan balance in favor of Prudential 
in the sum of $5,960.20 was paid off, as was the mortgage loan 
balance in favor of Continental in the sum of $27,322.30. (R. 
107) Also on September 25, 1985, Hodge gave a Warranty Deed to 
the Property to Cannefaxes. The Warranty Deed was recorded with 
the Salt Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985. (R. 107) 
The two transactions discussed above—the transfer of title from 
Barkers to Hodge, and the transfer of title from Hodge to 
Cannefaxes took place at a single real estate closing. (R. 
107-08) A title search conducted by the settlement agent, Surety 
Title Agency, between closing on September 25, 1985, and record-
ing on September 26, 1985, disclosed Clements1 Judgment against 
the Barkers. (R. 108). 
More than two years after their judgment was docketed 
in Salt Lake County, Clements caused an execution sale to be 
scheduled on Cannefaxes' home for September 22, 1987. 
(R. 142-44). In response, Cannefaxes filed this action seeking 
an injunction against the execution on the basis that Clements1 
judgment did not constitute a lien on their home. (R. 157-64). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently applied 
the doctrine of equitable conversion in holding that the seller's 
interest under a real estate contract is personal property and 
the buyer's interest is real property. Since the seller's 
interest is personal property, a judgment against the seller, 
which is a lien on all real property owned by him, is not a lien 
on the land previously sold on contract. 
2. Clements1 arguments notwithstanding, the majority 
rule is that a judgment against a contract seller is not a lien 
on the real property being sold. Most authorities favor the 
position that no lien should attach to the real property because 
it is equitably owned by the buyer and the seller only retains a 
security interest for payment of the purchase price. 
3. Utah is a lien theory state meaning that when 
title is conveyed for security purposes, the lender only obtains 
a lien on the property, not title thereto. The retention of 
title by Barkers under a real estate contract for security pur-
poses should be treated no different than when title is conveyed 
to someone other than the owner such as a mortgagee or a benefi-
ciary under a trust deed. In all three cases a judgment against 
the lender should not be a lien on the land. 
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4, The rule making a judgment against a land contract 
seller a lien should be rejected because it puts the burden on 
the contract buyer instead of the judgment creditor. It requires 
a contract buyer to decide at his peril who to make the contract 
payments to. If he decides wrong, he may have to pay twice. A 
better rule would be to require the judgment creditor, who has 
the burden of collecting the judgment, to take affirmative action 
to collect the judgment by execution or garnishment. Placing the 
burden upon the judgment creditor is particularly fair where, as 
here, notice of the contract is recorded and the judgment credi-
tor will obtain information on the contract at the same time he 
searches the record to determine what real property is owned by 
the defendant upon which he can execute. 
5. Even in those cases where the courts adopt the 
rule advocated by Clements, the buyer can continue to make pay-
ments to the seller until he has actual notice of the judgment 
lien, and payment of the balance owed on the contract without 
actual notice of the judgment removes it as a lien even though 
the payment is less than the amount owed on the judgment. The 
buyer does not have to search the judgment records prior to each 
payment. In this case, Clements have the burden of showing that 
Cannefaxes had actual notice, and they have not satisfied that 
burden because the only evidence is that the title company 
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handling the transaction had notice. There is not even any evi-
dence that the title company was Cannefaxes1 agent or acted on 
their behalf. Even if Clements' judgment is a lienf therefore, 
Barkers were paid by Cannefaxes without notice, and Clements exe-
cution should be enjoined. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER UTAH LAW, CLEMENT'S JUDGMENT IS NOT 
A LIEN UPON CANNEFAX'S HOME BECAUSE UNDER 
EQUITABLE CONVERS ION
 r BARKER1 S INTEREST 
WAS PERSONAL PROPERTY AND A JUDGMENT LIEN 
ONLY ATTACHES TO REAL PROPERTY. 
In Utah, a judgment is a lien upon all real property 
owned by the judgment debtor at the time the judgment is 
docketed, or acquired thereafter. As set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-22-1 (1977): 
From the time the judgment . . . is 
docketed . . . it becomes a lien upon all 
real property of the judgment debtor . . . 
in the county in which the judgment is 
entered, owned by him at the time or by 
him thereafter acquired. 
(emphasis added). Under that section, it is clear that a 
judgment lien attaches only to real property, not personal 
property owned by the debtor. Clements1 judgment did not, 
therefore, attach to Cannefaxes1 home because Barkers1 inter-
est therein, as a contract seller, was personal property under 
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the doctrine of equitable conversion. The Utah Supreme Court 
and the Utah Court of Appeals have consistently applied the 
doctrine of equitable conversion to hold that the seller's 
interest under a real estate contract is personal property and 
the interest of the buyer, who takes possession of the prop-
erty, is real property. 
In Allred v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 791 
(1964), the Utah Supreme Court first adopted equitable conver-
sion and held that the seller's interest under a real estate 
contract is personal property, stating, "[a]s a general rule 
an enforceable executory contract of sale has the effect of 
converting the interest of the vendor of real property to 
personalty." 393 P. 2d 792. In that case a husband and wife 
sold real and personal property on contract to their son and 
his wife. The husband then died, and the administrator 
claimed the real estate was property of the estate because the 
contract was not fully executed at the time of the husband's 
death. This court had no problem in rejecting that argument 
on the basis that equitable conversion converted the dece-
dent's interest under the contract to personal property not 
real property. It is important to note that the court did not 
hold that the estate retained an interest in the real property 
to the extent that the contract price was unpaid. 
-9-
The Utah Supreme Court next clearly held In re 
Estate of Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298 (1972), an 
estate tax case, that the seller's interest under a real 
estate contract is personal property not real property. In so 
holding, the court held that the decedent's widow could not 
exclude from the estate tax return her dower interest in real 
property sold by the decedent on contract because his interest 
in the contract was personalty, and stated as follows: 
. . . Equity says that from the contract, 
even while yet executory, the vendee 
acquires a 'real1 right, a right of 
property in the land, which though lacking 
in legal title, and therefore equitable 
only, is none the less the real, benefi-
cial ownership, subject however, to a lien 
of the vendor as security for the purchase 
price as long as that remains unpaid. 
This property in the land, upon the death 
of the vendee, descends to the heirs
 r or 
passes to the devisees, and is liable to 
the dower of his widow. The vendor stills 
holds the legal title, but only as 
trustee, and he in turn acquires equitable 
ownership of the purchase money; his 
property, as viewed by equity is no longer 
real estate, in the land, but personal 
estate, in the price, and if he dies 
before payment, it goes to his administra-
tors, not to his heirs. . . . (emphasis in 
original) 
Willson at 1300, quoting from Pommeroy Equity Jurisprudence, 
105 5th Ed. 1941, at page 135. 
The court's holding in Willson was stated at 1300 as follows: 
The fact that the seller retains bare 
legal title, does not have possession, use 
or control of the property, the transfer 
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of legal title and record title being 
dependent only upon the acts and conduct 
of the buyer, it would appear that the 
interest of the seller was properly taxed 
by the State Tax Commission of Utah as 
personal property . . . 
In Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 29 
Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739, 741 (1973), the Utah Supreme Court 
held in a condemnation action involving real property sold on 
contract that the buyer was the owner entitled to any increase 
in value of the property and that the seller's only right was 
to receive the balance owed on the contract for which he held 
a security interest in the real property: 
In such an executory contract the vendee 
(Jelco) acquires all the incidents of 
ownership except legal title. He is 
therefore in equity properly regarded as 
the owner of the property. Thus, in the 
absence of an agreement to the contrary, 
where the condemnor takes land subject to 
an executory contract, it is the vendee 
who is normally entitled to a condemnation 
award for the land so taken. It is he who 
is entitled to the benefit of any 
increase, and who must bear the detriment 
of any decrease, in the value of the 
property; whereas, the vendor (Jeremy) has 
only legal title. In regard to the pur-
chase price, what he is entitled to is to 
have it paid in accordance with the terms 
of the contract. He is of course also 
entitled to retain the legal title as 
security for its performance, and in case 
of default, to seek the remedies provided 
therein. 
511 P.2d 741. 
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In line with the above application of equitable 
conversion, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
the buyer's interest under a real estate contract is real 
property to which a judgment against the buyer constitutes a 
lien from the time it is docketed. In so holding, the court 
has determined that the statutory term "real property" in Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-22-1 (1977) includes the equitable interest of 
a buyer under an installment land sale contract. In Bill Nay 
and Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120 
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the lower court 
and held that a judgment against a contract buyer was a lien 
on his equitable interest in the real property being purchased 
by him on contract, as follows: 
The legal basis [for the lower court's 
decision] is clear. The interest of a 
purchaser under a real estate contract is 
an interest in real property that can be 
mortgaged. Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 
Utahf 646 P.2d 678 (1982). Upon the same 
reasoning this equitable interest is also 
subject to the judgment lien prescribed by 
U.C.A., 1953, S 78-22-1 Utah Cooperative 
Association v. White Distributing and 
Supply Co., 120 Utah 603, 237 P.2d 262 
(1951) 
677 P.2d 1121. 
In Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987), this court 
again held that the buyer's interest in a real estate contract 
is real property against which a judgment against the buyer is 
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a lien. In determining whether the judgment lien attached to 
the buyer's interest, the court said it must: 
analyze the relative interest of a vendor 
and a vendee in the land under a land sale 
contract, and specifically the interest of 
the [vendee] and the [vendor] prior to the 
termination of [the vendee's] interest. 
740 P.2d at 1254. 
In making that analysis, the court also noted: 
As a foundational matter, we note 
that a judgment lien has no greater 
dignity in property law than the nature of 
the property interest to which it 
attaches. In Dahl v. Prince, 119 Utah 
556, 561, 230 P.2d 328, 331 (1951), this 
court held that "neither [an] attaching 
creditor nor an execution creditor is in 
the position of a bona fide purchaser for 
value." (citations omitted) 
740 P.2d 1257. 
In holding that a judgment lien against the buyer attaches to 
his equitable interest in the real property, the Utah Supreme 
Court explained the interests of a buyer and seller under a 
land sales contract as follows: 
Under an installment land sale 
contract, the vendor retains legal title 
as security for the purchase price of the 
property. Oaks v. Kendell, 23 Cal. App. 
2d 715, 73 P.2d 1255 (1937); Marks v. City 
of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199 
(1979). Nevertheless, as a general 
proposition, the vendee is treated as the 
owner of the land. C&J Industries, Inc. 
v. Bailey, 618 P.2d 58, 59 (Utah 1980); 
-13-
Rush v, Anestos, 104 Idaho 630, 634, 661 
P.2d 1229, 1233 (1983). . . . 
By retaining the legal title, the 
vendor retains an important right in the 
land. The doctrine of equitable conversa-
tion characterizes the seller's interest 
as an interest in personalty and not as 
one in realty, whereas the vendee's 
interest under the executory contract is 
deemed an interest in realty . . . . 
The vendor's interest is similar to 
the security interest of a purchase money 
mortgagee. 
740 P.2d 1254-55. 
In addition to the above Utah Supreme Court deci-
sions which have consistently characterized the seller's 
interest under a land installment sale contract as personal 
property and the buyer's as real property, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has held in this case and one other that the doctrine 
of equitable conversion precludes a judgment from attaching to 
real property which the judgment debtor has sold under a valid 
and enforceable contract prior to the docketing of the judg-
ment. In Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987), 
the Utah Court of Appeals applied equitable conversion to hold 
that a judgment against the seller under an earnest money 
sales agreement was not a lien on the land because the sell-
er's interest was personal property, not real property: 
In the case at bar, Lach executed a 
binding earnest money agreement on Novem-
ber 28, 1980. Regardless of the effect of 
executing the deed on the same day, the 
Earnest Money Agreement precludes the 
attachment of the Bank's judgment lien. 
When this agreement was executed, Lach 
[the buyer] became the equitable owner of 
the property and the judgment debtors, the 
Dewsnups [the seller], held only a person-
alty interest in the property. The Bank's 
docketing of a judgment against the 
Dewsnups on December 12, 1980 did not 
create a judgment lien against the prop-
erty because the Dewsnups did not then 
have a real property interest to which the 
lien could attach. Under the uncontro-
verted facts, and as a matter of law, Lach 
owns the property free from any judgment 
lien in favor of the Bank. . . . 
746 P.2d 805-06. 
Notwithstanding Clements' argument that the doctrine 
of equitable conversion is a principle in equity which should 
only be applied if it's application is equitable, the Utah 
courts have consistently applied it in holding that from the 
moment the contract is created, the seller's interest is the 
right to receive the money, which is personal property, and 
the buyer's interest is the right to receive the land, upon 
payment of the agreed purchase price, which is real property. 
Not one Utah case cited to this court has deviated from that 
2 
principle, regardless of the equities involved. The court 
* The case of Reynolds v. Van 
1979) cited at 18-19 of Clements 
their position that this court 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Wagoner, 592 P.2d 593 (Utah 
opening Brief as support for 
has only applied equitable 
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should not now deviate from that position of consistency and 
find that for purposes of a judgment lien the seller's inter-
est is real property because it is contrary to prior case law 
and to do so would be inequitable as set forth in Point III of 
this Brief. 
Furthermore, this court has already held that the 
buyer's interest under an installment land sale contract is 
real property to which a judgment lien against the buyer 
attaches. It would be inconsistent with that position to now 
hold that the seller's interest is also real property and that 
a judgment lien against the seller attaches to that real 
property to the prejudice of the buyer. Logically, both the 
buyer and the seller cannot own the property and if this court 
has already determined that the buyer does, the seller cannot, 
and a judgment against a contract seller should not be a lien 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
conversion when it is equitable to do so is not on point. In 
that case, the doctrine didn't apply because the contract 
seller attempted to use it to his advantage to change the con-
tract of sale and prevent the buyer from the relief to which 
he was entitled under the contract. There, the contract buyer 
had failed to pay the taxes and the seller bought the property 
at tax sale. The seller attempted to characterize the buyer's 
interest as real property, under equitable conversion, so as 
to nullify the buyer's rights under the contract to bring it 
current. 
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on land sold under contract prior to the judgment being 
docketed. 
POINT II 
OTHER COURTS AND COMMENTATORS FAVOR A RULE 
THAT A JUDGMENT LIEN AGAINST A SELLER ON 
AN INSTALLMENT LAND SALE CONTRACT DOES NOT 
ATTACH TO THE REAL PROPERTY BEING SOLD. 
A. The Majority of Courts in Other 
Jurisdictions Hold That A Judgment 
Lien Does Not Attach to Real Property 
Sold By the Judgment Debtor On Con-
tract Prior to the Judgment Being 
Docketed. 
Contrary to Clements1 position, the majority of 
courts hold that a judgment against a contract seller is not a 
lien on real property sold by him on contract prior to the 
time the judgment is docketed. In addition to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, several courts in other jurisdictions have held 
that a judgment docketed against a land contract seller after 
the contract is entered into is not a lien on the land, Marks 
v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1979) 
(n[T]he interest retained by a vendor under an executory 
contract of sale is personalty and not real estate. Since 
S 39-1-6 permits a judgment lien only upon real estate and 
since the judgment debtors1 interest in the property was 
converted to personalty, the City's judgment did not ripen 
into a lien on the real estate involved"); M.L. Gordon Sash 
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and Door Co. v. Mormann, 271 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. 1978) (Under a 
series of contracts including an option contract entered into 
for the purchase of real property before a judgment was 
docketed against the seller of the land, the judgment did not 
constitute a lien on the land even though the option was 
exercised after the judgment was docketed); Clarence M. Bull, 
Inc. v. Goldman, 30 Md. App. 665, 353 A.2d 661, 663 (1976) ("A 
judgment obtained by a third person against the vendor after 
the execution of a contract does not defeat or impair the 
purchaser's equitable interest, nor does it constitute a lien 
on the purchaser's land."); Mueller v. Novelty Dye Works, 273 
Wis. 501, 78 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1956) (Seller's interest under 
an installment land sale contract was personal property and a 
judgment lien against seller docketed 50 days after contract 
signed did not attach to real estate covered by the contract, 
but judgment creditor could use other procedures to attach 
personal property interest of seller under the contract); Hull 
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 79 So.2d 517, 518-19 (Fla. 1954) 
(Equitable conversion precludes judgment against seller of 
real property under contract from attaching to land because 
seller only owns naked legal title, not an equitable interest 
in the land); Jackson v. Faver, 210 Ga. 58, 77 S.E.2d 728 
(1953) (Judgment creditor against land contract seller could 
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not execute on land which he sold on contract prior to entry 
of judgment and deeded to buyer after judgment but before 
execution on judgment); Stecker v. Snyder, 193 P.2d 881, 884 
(Colo. 1948) (Attaching creditor of a seller of real property 
previously sold on contract has only the right to collect the 
contract payments due the seller); Snow Bros. Hardware Co. v. 
Ellis, 180 Ark. 238, 21 S.W.2d 162f 163 (1929) (A judgment 
lien attaches only to real estate, not a security interest in 
real estate, and a judgment against a land contract seller 
docketed after the contract was signed is not a lien on the 
land because the sellers1 interest under the contract is only 
a security interest); State Bank of Decatur v. Sanders, 170 
S.W. 86, 88-89 (Ark. 1914) (Equitable conversion precludes a 
judgment against a land contract seller from attaching to real 
property sold on contract prior to the judgment being 
entered); Cumminqs v. First National Bank of Siqourney, 202 
N.W. 556, 556 (Iowa 1925) (A vendor's interest under a con-
tract for the sale of real property being personal property, 
"it necessarily follows that a judgment obtained against the 
vendor after the date of the contract does not become a lien 
upon the land"); Westinqhouse Lamp Co. v. Ingram, 90 S.E. 837, 
838-39 (W.Va. 1916) (Judgment entered against a land contract 
seller after he sold real property on contract is not a lien 
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on the land because the buyer owns the equitable interest 
therein); Jones v. Howard, 43 S.W. 635f 636 (Mo, 1897) 
(Judgment creditor cannot execute on land sold by judgment 
debtor on contract prior to execution because judgment debtor, 
having sold the land, holds title in trust for the buyer and 
the seller does not hold an interest in the land that can be 
executed on). 
B. Commentators Favor The Rule That a Judgment 
Entered Against A Contract Land Seller After he 
Sells Land on Contract is not a Lien on the 
Land, 
In addition to the courts that hold a judgment 
against a seller under an installment land sales contract does 
not constitute a lien on the real property, the commentators 
discussing the issue favor that result because it is more 
equitable than the alternative. Lacey, Creditors of Land 
Contract Vendors, 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 645, 656 (1973) 
(hereinafter, Lacy at ) Simpson, Legislative Changes in the 
Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 
578-79 (1935) (hereinafter Simpson at ); and III Am. Law 
Real Property § 11.29 at 82-83, 86 (A. Casner Ed. 1952). 
After discussing the pros and cons of the two rules for and 
against allowing a judgment against the seller to be a lien on 
land he sold on contract before entry of the judgment, Lacey 
concludes that no lien should attach: 
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I submit that the difference between real 
and personal property, or more to the 
point, between general ownership of land 
and the contractual claim to a money 
payment, is not just a conceptual distinc-
tion but has a functional justification. 
First, ownership of land is a matter of 
official record everywhere in the United 
States. Although many land contracts and 
assignments of contract are recorded, with 
varying effect from state to state, 
perhaps more are not. Furthermore, 
because payments on the contract will very 
seldom be a matter of record, a ruling 
treating vendor's interests like real 
property for purposes of judgment liens 
and levies of execution will produce 
disputes about validity and priority that 
must be resolved by the uncertain determi-
native of parol evidence. Even more 
importantly, a rule that a judgment is a 
lien on the vendor's interest creates much 
undesirable uncertainty about the rights 
and duties of third persons. A purchaser 
should not be required to decide, at his 
peril, between the rival, informal claims 
of his vendor and of his vendor's credi-
tor, and perhaps of his assignee, nor 
should he be put to the trouble of an 
interpleader suit, nor be given an excuse 
to avoid all payments. There is certainly 
much to be said for permitting, and 
requiring, a purchaser to pay in accor-
dance with his contract until officially 
ordered to do otherwise. 
Lacey at 656. 
Similarly, Simpson states at 579: 
Some courts have held, and, it would seem, 
with sound reason, that the vendor's 
judgment creditors acquire no liens 
against the purchasers even though the 
purchase price is unpaid and the purchaser 
knows of the judgment. This works no 
injustice upon the creditors, who may 
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proceed by garnishment to reach the 
purchase money or by bill for equitable 
execution to reach both purchase money and 
vendor's lien. 
There is no good reason, therefore, for this court 
to ignore the principle of equitable conversion which it has 
consistently adopted and hold that Clements' judgment against 
Barkers constitutes a lien on Cannefaxes' home. Especially 
when Clements (who are parties to the lawsuit with Barkers), 
as opposed to Cannefaxes (who are not), are in a better 
position to know about the judgment and the remedies available 
for collecting the same. Specifically, Clements had collec-
tion remedies available to them, including execution on 
Barkers' interest in the contract or garnishment of the 
payments thereunder, which if exercised promptly, would have 
allowed Clements to realize upon Barkers' interest under the 
contract. Instead, Clements waited two years before they used 
those remedies and during that time Barkers' contract interest 
was paid. In all equity, Clements' lack of diligence should 
not be rewarded with a lien on Cannefaxes' home. Neither 
should Cannefaxes or any other contract buyer be put to the 
burden of deciding at his peril who to make the payments to 
under the contract until officially ordered to do so by way of 
an execution or garnishment proceeding. 
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POINT III 
THERE ARE GOOD POLICY REASONS WHY A 
JUDGMENT AGAINST A CONTRACT SELLER SHOULD 
NOT BE A LIEN ON THE REAL PROPERTY BEING 
SOLD UNDER CONTRACT. 
A. Barkers Only Interest in the Land Under the 
Contract was a Security Interest to Which a 
Judgment Lien Should Not Attach. 
As stated in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 
1255 (Utah 1987), "[t]he vendor's interest is similar to the 
security interest of a purchase money mortgagee." In sub-
stance, the seller's interest under an installment land sale 
contract is no different than the interest of a lender under a 
3 
mortgage or a trust deed. In each case the lender holds only 
a security interest even though title may be conveyed for the 
benefit of the lender, i.e. an outright deed in favor of a 
lender intended as a mortgage. Because Utah is a lien theory 
state, if Barkers and Hodge had used a trust deed or mortgage, 
there would be no question that Barkers' only interest in the 
property is a lien (not title thereto) even though the real 
property would have been conveyed by Hodge for the benefit of 
3
 As further evidence that Barkers only held a security 
interest in the property, they could not have involuntarily 
forfeited Hodge's interest because she had too much equity; 
having paid more than 25% of the contract price. Barkers' 
only recourse on default was, therefore, like that of a 
mortgagee—foreclose the contract. Perkins v. Spencer, 243 
P.2d 446 (Utah 1952). 
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the Barkers. Bvbee v. Stuart, 189 P.2d 118, 123 (Utah 1948); 
Kiar v. Brimlev, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (1972) (a deed on 
its face conveying the property outright, but pursuant to an 
oral agreement that the deed was intended only as a mortgage, 
conveys only a lien, not title to the property); and I BYU 
Summary of Utah Real Property Lawf § 9.36 at 316. It follows 
then that a judgment against a lender holding a mortgage or 
the beneficial interest under a trust deed on real property 
does not constitute a lien upon that real property. Neither 
should a judgment against a contract seller, who holds only a 
security interest, be a lien on the land because to do so 
would be to treat it different from other security devices 
commonly used and elevate form over substance. 
B. A Judgment Against a Contract Seller Should Not 
be a Lien Because It Wrongfully Puts the Burden 
of Collecting the Judgment on the Contract 
Buyer Instead of the Judgment Creditor. 
The rule advocated by Clements should not be adopted 
because it puts the burden on the contract buyer to decide who 
the contract payments should be made to at his peril. If he 
decides wrong, the contract buyer will be required to pay the 
contract twice, once in satisfaction of the contract and 
second, in payment of the contract seller's judgments. In 
addition, a technical application of the rule would require a 
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contract buyer to search the judgment records before every 
payment is made in order to avoid paying the wrong person. In 
the event a judgment is found and the contract seller does not 
agree as to how payment should be made, the buyer would then 
be forced to incur the burden and expense of an interpleader 
action which it should not be required to do. 
The record is clear that a notice of Barkers1 
contract was recorded prior to the time Clements1 judgment was 
docketed in Salt Lake County. Because a judgment creditor has 
constructive notice of recorded documents affecting the 
debtors1 real property under Utah Code Ann. S 57-3-2 (1953, as 
amended), and because Utah law does not elevate a judgment 
4 
creditor to the status of a good faith purchaser for value, 
there is good justification for placing the burden upon the 
judgment lien holder to enforce his rights as opposed to 
requiring the contract buyer to act at his peril. Certainly 
the judgment lien holder can obtain a lien on the contract 
seller's interest by taking the proper steps to perfect the 
same. All he has to do is execute on the seller's interest in 
4
 Dahl v. Prince, 119 Utah 556, 561, 230 P.2d 328, 331 
(1951) (a judgment creditor does not qualify as a good faith 
purchaser); and Kartchner v. State Tax Commission, 4 Utah 2d 
382, 294 P.2d 790 (1956) (a judgment lien does not attach to 
real property conveyed by the judgment debtor prior to the 
lien being docketed by an unrecorded deed). 
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the contract or garnish the payments as they become due. 
Lacey at 662. The judgment lien holder will be put to no 
extra burden because in searching the records to determine 
what real property is owned by the judgment debtor, he should 
at the same time discover the recorded notice of contract and 
become aware of the judgment debtors1 entitlement to the 
payments under the contract, which by execution or garnish-
ment, he may have applied towards payment on the judgment. 
That is exactly the course followed by Oregon, a 
jurisdiction Clements cite as support for the rule that a 
judgment is a lien on the contract seller's interest. As 
stated by the Oregon Supreme Court in May v. Emerson, 96 P. 
454, (1908), a case cited by Clements: 
However, the docketing of the judgment is 
not constructive notice to [the contract 
buyer]. He is not bound to search the 
records every time he makes a payment. He 
is entitled to the benefit of all payments 
made to the lender until he has actual 
knowledge of the lien. (citations omit-
ted). Defendant [the contract buyer] was 
not required to make the payments to 
plaintiff [judgment creditor] as they 
matured, until plaintiff acquired the 
vendor1s rights. The vendee cannot assume 
to determine for himself, and at his risk, 
the controversy between plaintiff and his 
debtor; and defendant need not go into 
equity to settle their differences. He 
may stand upon his contract, and when 
plaintiff has acquired the vendor's right 
to the money by perfecting title in 
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himself, the defendant will be justified 
in making payment to him. 
96 P. 454-55, 
Because under May and other Oregon cases, the rights 
of a contract buyer in Oregon were uncertain after a judgment 
was entered against the contract seller, the Oregon legisla-
ture resolved the problem with a statute which provides that 
the recorded interests of a contract buyer take priority over 
a judgment lien against the seller, if the buyer's contract 
interest is recorded before the judgment is entered. The 
statute still allows the judgment creditor to execute on the 
seller's interest in the contract. Quinn v. Southern Pacific 
Transportation Co. , 711 P.2d 137, 138-39 (Ore. App. 1985). As 
public policy, therefore, Oregon has in the end decided it is 
better to put the burden on the judgment creditor by requiring 
him to use his collection remedies instead of creating a lien 
on the seller's interest to the detriment of the buyer. The 
Court here should adopt a similar rule. 
In the end analysis there are two themes underlying 
the opposite rules adopted by the courts creating a lien on 
the sellers interest and the rule of no lien. Lacey at 
653-55. The first theme, supporting Clements position, is 
"don1t-let-the-vendor-escape-his-debts." Id. at 655. The 
second, supporting Cannefaxes1 position, is "don1t-make-the-
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purchaser-pay-twice." Id. As a corollary to the second 
theme, a purchaser shouldn't be burdened with a lien on his 
land or be forced into deciding who to pay at his peril. 
Adoption of one rule versus the other does not preclude the 
judgment creditor from collecting his debt from the sellers1 
assets. On the contrary, the only difference between the two 
rules is that one allows an immediate lien and the other 
requires some additional act on the part of the judgment 
creditor to perfect his rights in the seller's property, such 
as execution or garnishment. In light of the fact that even 
the immediate lien route requires an affirmative act by the 
judgment creditor—notification to the buyer—it is more 
equitable to require that act be in the form of execution or 
garnishment. Then there is no question. The judgment creditor 
has clearly perfected his lien in the seller's property and 
the buyer knows who to pay, having been directed to do so by 
governmental authority. Certainly, as in this case, where the 
judgment creditor waits two years to execute, his lack of 
diligence should not be rewarded with a lien on the residence 
of a third party. This court should, therefore, enjoin 
Clements from executing on Cannefaxes home. 
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POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE COURT HOLDS THAT CLEMENTS' 
JUDGMENT IS A LIENr THE EXECUTION SHOULD BE 
ENJOINED BECAUSE CLEMENTS HAVE FAILED TO 
PROVE THAT CANNEFAXES HAD ACTUAL NOTICE OF 
THE JUDGMENT WHEN THEY BOUGHT THE HOUSE FROM 
HODGE. 
Even if this Court adopts the rule creating a lien 
on the contract seller's interest, however, Clements1 execu-
tion should still be enjoined because under that rule the 
buyer can continue to make payments to the seller until he has 
actual notice of the judgment lien, and payment of the balance 
owed on the contract without actual notice of the judgment 
removes it as a lien even though the payment is less than the 
amount owed on the judgment. Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d 
1377, 1381 (Utah App. 1990) quoting from Simpson at 578. 
Here, Clements have the burden of proving Cannefaxes had 
actual notice, and they have not satisfied that burden because 
the only evidence is that the title company handling the 
transaction had notice. There is not even any evidence that 
the title company was Cannefaxes' agent or acted on their 
behalf. Clements simply have not carried their burden, 
especially where, as here, a higher standard of proof of 
actual notice should be required before a contract buyer loses 
his house because of a judgment against the seller. Chistie 
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v. Morris, 119 Mont. 383, 176 P.2d 660 (1946) (even though 
judgment was a lien on the contract sellers1 interest, the 
buyer still got credit for payments made on the contract after 
the judgment was entered because the judgment creditor failed 
to carry its burden of proving the buyer had actual notice 
because the only evidence was that the buyer had a copy of an 
abstract at the time of his payments). Because Clements have 
failed to prove that Cannefaxes had actual notice of the 
judgment against Barkers, even if this court holds the judg-
ment is a lien, Clements should not be able to enforce the 
lien on Cannefaxes1 home and the execution should be enjoined. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents Raymond P.L. 
Cannefax and Debra Cannefax respectfully request that the 
court sustain the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
this action and remand it to the District Court for entry of a 
summary judgment in their favor quieting title to the subject 
real property in them and against Donald W. and Ruth L. 
Clements. 
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ADDENDUM 
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STATE CF UTAH 
i 
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DONA-J A. CLEMENT and RUTH L. ) Civil No- C87-6232 
CLEMENT, ) 
Defendants. ) Judge Pat B, Brian 
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O p p o s i t i o n to D e f e n d a n t s " Motion for S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t ail A 
w h i c h are on f i ' j I' i M I i n i i ' 11 i 11 i..,, 11 L a i J I I n i> i a i; I n m e n t s 
of counsel. Having considered the above pleadings and oral 
argument/ and good cause appearing/ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted; and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
judgment be, and hereby is/ entered in favor of defendants and 
against plaintiffs on the Complaint on file herein, and the 
Complaint is hereby dismissed; and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. As a matter of law, a contract vendor of real 
property does retain an interest in the real property which is 
subject to the lien of a judgment against him. 
2. When defendants1 Judgment against George W. Barker, 
Jr. and Lila Mr. Barker was docketed with the Clerk of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County on August 19/ 1985, 
that Judgment created a valid lien against the property at 2563 
East Lockhart Road in Salt Lake County, Utah, which property is 
more particularly described in paragraph 5 of the Verified 
Complaint herein. 
3. In this case/ in light of Stipulated Fact No. 14, 
it is equitable that the judgment lien created when said Judgment 
was docketed in Salt Lake County bound the property to the extent 
of the amount unpaid on the Uniform Real Estate Contract between 
the Barkers, as sellers, and Diane Hodge, as buyer, on September 
25, 1985, (the date Diane Hodge received a warranty deed from the 
Barkers and gave a warranty deed to plaintiffs), less the amount 
of the prior encumbra ^es on the property in favor of Prudential 
2 
Federal Savings & L 3 a n Assoc ia t io n a n d C o n tin e nt a1 Ba nk a n • 3 T r u st 
Company ; t: ::) * :i t: t:he j \ idgmen t: 1 i en bound L a e L U C K 
pi: opec t} i • i ' I i! n iiii o 
LI 15 FURTHER ORDERED :na': fc.he temporary injunctioa in 
effect in this case should be,. i hereby dissolved. 
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) Civil No. C87-6232 
) Judge Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Rodney M. 
Pipella, and defendants, by and through their attorneys, Steven 
H. Lybbert and Bruce E. Coke of Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, stipulate 
to the following facts. In doing so, counsel agree that other 
facts not stipulated to may be relevant to the issues raised in 
the pleadings. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
1. On August 28, 1981, George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila 
M. Barker ("the Barkers") were fee simple owners of the real 
property described in paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' Verified 
Complaint ("the Lockhart Road property"). 
2, 
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 t * j a t *ons 
agains t" r hp if "i PI ( i i jdent . i a i F e d e r a l S a v i n g s * 
i ' a . ' T r u d e n l i a l " i and C o n t i n e n t a l BanK and I I U S L 
Compar. ' C o n t i n e n t a l " ) . 




 r ! • ';* i i e i .</. » ' t h e j a i l Lake County R e c o r d e r as 
i M . t r y I'M 360019* a" BouN C . ;R7 Page US 
ci i^ri " \ i j q i i s t i'" I Q P'- d e f e n d * n ' * MMM < lernent 
and Rui1"!'! I 'lempn* t*' A I hi I i "-* I jiiiem" he S e v e n t h .d. *" 
[iLst-f i " ' ui k. - '• " j in tah C'junty a g a i n s t t h e B a r k e r s i n Lne 
amount -if $ 7 0 , 5 2 6 . 0 0 . 
t "in i"nii,|ijs' ]5 i iflc, inf i. 11 1,M 11 judgment w a s 
d o c k e t P'1 '" " 1 " i " 1 ' " ' j I h i i d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Cou r t of 
Sal t , uikr* jounty in Docket Book 200 a*. Page 153 . 
7. Defendants* judgment aga insc . 
a p p e a l e d . 
8 . CM mytembf'-i *-'"n 1^8^ i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r t o t h * 
t r a n s a c t i o n d e s c r m e d in t h e p a r a g r a p h s which f o l l o w , t h e R.i,„ I rM 3 
h e l d l e g a l t i t l e to t h e L o c k h a r t Pu^il p I^-I i • nl,ijt-ct •.• j u i i n e 
Hodge's interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.1 
9- On September 25, 1985, Diane Hodge owed $87,747.40 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the Barkers. The prior 
obligations to Prudential and Continental totaled $33,282.50. 
10. On September 25, 1985, the Barkers gave a Warranty 
Deed to the Property to Diane Hodge. The Warranty Deed was 
recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985 
as Entry No. 4142674 at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1268. 
11. On September 25, 1985, at the time of delivery of 
the Warranty Deed referred to in paragraph 10, Diane Hodge paid 
the Barkers $45,000.00, and the Barkers gave Ms. Hodge a credit 
of $9,464.94. The mortgage loan balance in favor of Prudential 
in the sum of $5,960.20 was paid off, as was the mortgage loan 
balance in favor of Continental in the sum of $27,322.30. 
12. Also on September 25, 1985, Diane Hodge gave a 
Warranty Deed to the Property to plaintiffs Raymond P.L. Cannefax 
and Debra Cannefax. The Warranty Deed was recorded with the Salt 
Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985, as Entry No. 4142675 
at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1270. 
13. The two transactions discussed above—the transfer 
of title from the Barkers to Diane Hodge, and the transfer of 
title from Diane Hodge to plaintiffs—took place at a single real 
estate closing. A true and correct copy of the U.S. Department 
1. After entering into the contract with Ms. Hodge, the Barkers 
gave quit claim deeds to the property to other people named 
Barker—presumably their children. On or before September 25, 
1985, but prior to the other transactions of September 25, the 
Barkers received back quit claim deeds to the property from their 
quit claim grantees. 
-3-
of
 """'"'"1 "ml lUm, | in,,., MhMiieiiL statement between 
Diane Hodge and plaintiffs is attached hereto. 
14. A title search conducted by the settlement agent, 
Surety Title Agency, between closing on September 25, 1985 and 
recording on September 26, 1985 disclosed defendants' Judgment 
against the Barkers. 
Dated this jffl d a y O1 f r > <=> ^  o ^  5 e j
 r 1 • = n •? 
AWTorney for Plaintiffs 
l^ i -*rj 1 hin l^ ' d.ny ,,,f December, 1987. 
NYGAARI • COKE & VINCENT 
-trfaJ~~ 
Steven f I 1 y bfcrerT 
Attor 1 iev s for Defendants 
I 
CANNEFAX v. CLEMENT Utah 1377 
CUe as 786 P.2d 137/ (t'tah App. 1990) 
the limits of the judicial reshaping" of legis- broad and facially invalid.11 The subsec-
lative enactments by substantially rewnt- tion may not. therefore, be enforced 
ing the ordinance" Id at l&v* , : accord again.^t Huber or anyone else See Brock-
Mussel ma n r Commonwealth 705 S W 2d ett i Spokane Arcades. Inc.. 472 US 491, 
476. 477 (Ky 19*6) ("[Cllearly the judiciary 503-04. 105 S Ct. 2794. 2801-02. S6 L.Ed.2d 
lacks power to add new phra.se> to a <tat- 394 '19*5). 
ute to provide a new meaning neces.^arv to
 T h e c o r n i c t l o n 1S reversed 
render the statute constitutional ") 
We are well aware of our responsibility 
to construe statutes and ordinances so as 
to earn out legislative intent while avoid-
ing constitutional defects Sec hi re a 
Criminal Investigation, 754 P 2d 633. 640 
(Utah 1988), In re Boyer. 636 P 2d 10*5. 
10*8 (Utah 1981); see also Swoboda. 658 
S W 2d at 25 However, we will not re-
write a statute or ignore its plain language 
in order to reach a constitutional construc-
tion Willden. 76* P 2d at 45* In light of 
the municipality s use of the expansive 
term "abusive language" and its express 
intent to penalize speech that merely an-
noys, inconveniences, or alarms persons 
who may not even be its targets, unre-
stricted by the addressee s likely response, 
we decline to narrow the scope of Logan 
City Ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) under the 
guise of judicial construction Like the 
court in Conchito, 521 P 2d at 1388, we do 
not confuse the power to construe with the 
power to legislate See also Musselman. 
705 S.W.2d at 477 It is for the municipali-
ty, not for this court, to fashion a narrowly 
drawn ordinance that criminalizes unpro-
tected speech as deemed necessary by city 
officials. 
Because Logan City Ordinance 12-8-
9(2)(D) is susceptible of application to sub-
stantial amounts of speech which, though 
perhaps vulgar or insulting, are none-
theless protected, it is constitutionally over-
12. In contrast, the Oklahoma court recenth de 
clined to hold facialK overbroad an ordinance 
expressly punishing "abusive or violent lan-
tude." The court concluded that the latter 
phrase in the ordinance, as previouslv con-
strued to require conduct that incites violence 
or tends to provoke others to break the peace, 
was within the boundaries set bv Chaplinskv 
and later "fighting words" cases. Harrington v 
DAVIDSON and GARFF, JJ . concur 
Raymond P.L. CANNEFAX and Debra 
Cfc*\s\*CsL*, Ptauvtvfts wvd . \wel ta \ t s . 
v. 
Donald W. CLEMENT and Ruth L. 
Clement, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 8901 ^ 2-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 2. 1990. 
Purchasers who had acquired property 
from contract vendee brought quiet title 
action against contract vendors' creditors. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County. 
Pat B Brian. J . rendered summary judg-
Cuv of Tulsa. 763 P 2d 700, 701 (Okla Cnm.App 
1988) 
13. In light of our disposition of this case on the 
first amendment overbreadth issue, we need not 
reach the other important issues presented by 
Huber. including his claims that the ordinance 
is unconstitutionally vague and that, even if 
narrow Iv construed as punishing only "fighting 
words.' the ordinance cannot constitutionally 
be applied to his speech 
1378 v^h "*<> I ' 'I l« ' I 'MIITR ?d SFRIES 
meni in favor of creditors, and purchasers 
appealed. The Court of .Appeals. Billings. 
J., held that, under doctrine of eouitanie 
conversion, vendors' retained interest un-
der the contract was not real property, and 
thus docketed judgment did not create a 
judgment lien airams* -.•• proper y. 
Reversed w;tn direction. 
Jackson. J., filed a concurring opinion, 
J. Robert Buiiock. Senior District 
Judge, filed a «1is sen ting opinion. 
1 ^ • n iJ o i' (ii HJ \ u r v h a s e r <. = "> J 
Eu stable ''"PA er^ion" doctrine pro-
vide? that, once parties nave entered into a 
binding and enforceable land sale contract. 
purchaser's interest in the contract is said 
to be real property and vendor's retained 
interest is characterized as persona! proper-
ty, and the rights of the parties are evalu-
ated a- if :he conveyance had been made. 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Judgment c=7^0»3i 
Under doctrine of equitable conversion, 
vendors retained interest under a uniform 
real estate contract was not real property, 
and thus docketed judgment against the 
vendors did not create a judgment lien 
against the property. U.C. A. 1953, 78-22-1. 
Rodney M. Pipella (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellants.. 
Steven H. Lybbert (argued). Salt Lake 
City, for defendants and respondents. 




Raymond and Deora Cannefax ("Canne-
faxes") appeal a summary judgment en-
1. J. Robert Bullock Senior District Judge, sii 
ting bv special appointment our.uaru to I, rah 
tered against them m their ouiet title action 
and in tuvor of ih>nnld and Ruth Clement 
'"Clements"). In granting summary judg-
ment, the court held that a seller's retained 
!e«ja! title to real property under an exec-
< it«-rv land sale contract was "real proper-
ty" and. therefore, that a judgment docket-
ed by the Clements, the seller's creditors, 
was a hen against the property pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann, $ >-22- i G>7i. We re-
verse. 
George W. Barker. Jr. and Liia M. Bark-
er ("Barkers"* were fee simple owners of 
the Lockhart Road Property at issue in this 
ouiet title action. In 19M. the Barkers 
entered into a uniform real estate contract 
to sell their property to Diane Hodge ("Ms. 
Hodge"* for >lh"0.ooo. Ms. Hodge paid 
>4n,o(H) to the Barker-- at the time of the 
sale and she was to pay the balance over 
the contract term On August 31. 19M, 
M>. Hodge recorded a notice of her i ini 
form real estate contract. 
Four years later, the 1 'lements < /btatned 
a judgment against the Barkers for 570,526 
which was docketed in August 1985. The 
stipulated facts show no attempt by the 
Clements to execute against the Barkers' 
retained interest in the Lockhart Road 
Property nor any attempt to garnish the 
proceeds Ms. Hodge paid to the Barkers 
during the executory period of the uniform 
real estate contract. 
On September 25. 1985. Ms. Hodge paid 
the remaining amount due under her uni-
form real estate contract with the Barkers. 
satisfied prior obligations on the Lockhart 
Road Property, and the Barkers deeded the 
property to her. At the same meeting, Ms. 
Hodge sold the property to the Cannefaxes 
and gave them a warranty deed to the 
Lockhart Road Property. After the dual 
closings were completed, Surety Title con-
ducted a title search which disclosed the 
Clements' judgment docketed against the 
Barkers. This is the first mention in the 
stipulated facts of any actual knowledge of 
the Clements' judgment.. 
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(20) i 1 W V 
CANNEFAX v. CLEMENT 
Cite as 78* P2d 1377 UtahApp 1990) 
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Subsequently the Clements obtained d 
writ of execution against the LOCK hart 
Road Propertv then owned in fet- >impie b\ 
the Cannefaxes In r^spon>e the Canne-
faxtb brought thi^ quiet title actum 
The trial court granted ^umman judg-
ment in favor of the Clements noiding 
their judgment was a hen on the Lock hart 
Road Property to the extent of $54 4M 94 
the amount which remained unpaid on the 
uniform real estate contract between their 
judgment debtors, the Barkers and Ms. 
Hodge on September 25. 19v5 the date the 
Barkers deeded Ms Hodge the property 
[I] We find the trial court s ruling con-
trary to the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion which ib the law in Utah Under the 
doctrine of equitable conversion, once par-
ties have entered into a binding and en-
forceab)e land sa)e contract, the buyers 
interest in the contract is said to be real 
property and the seller s retained interest 
is characterized as personal propertv R. 
Cunningham. W Stoebuck. & D ,,T'hitman, 
The Law of Property § 10 13. at 698 (1984). 
The rights of the parties are evaluated as if 
the conveyance had been made, h McChn-
tock. McClmtock on Equity § 106, at 284 
(1948) [hereinafter "McClmtock on Equi-
t y ' l 
The Utah Supreme Court first adopted 
the doctrine of equitable conversion in 
Allred v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396. 393 P 2d 
791 (1964). The court characterized the 
seller's interest under a land sale contract 
as personalty, stating, t4[a]s a general rule 
an enforceable executory contract of sale 
has the effect of converting the interest of 
the vendor of real property to personalty." 
393 P26 at 792. Ag&n in In re Estate of 
Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P 2d 1298 
(1972), the court clearly held that the inter-
est of a seller under a land sale contract 
2. The dissent ignores the previous precedent, 
and rather relies upon its interpretation of 
Reynolds v Van Wagoner, 592 P 2d 593 (Utah 
1979). claiming the Utah court chose not to 
applv the doctrine of equitable conversion in, 
this case because "it would have led to an ineq-
uitable result inconsistent with the contractual 
was persona/ propertv. not rea/ property, 
for mneritance tax purpo>es 499 P 2d at 
131 H i-i > 1 
The court applied the doctrine of eq-
uitanie conversion in a condemnation con-
text m Jticn ' Thtm Judicial Dist Court. 
29 Utah 2d 472. i l l P 2d 739 <iy73» in 
Jclco. both the buyer and the seller under 
an executory land sale contract claimed a 
right to the increase in value of the land 
which had been condemned The court 
held the buyer was the owner of the land, 
and thus he was entitled to the condemna-
tion proceeds 511 P 2d at 741 In describ-
ing the status of the vendor under the 
contract the court stated, "the vendor 
has only legal title In regard to the pur-
cha>e price, what he is entitled to is to have 
it paid in accordance with the terms of the 
contract' Id. See. also Bill Xay & Sons 
Excavating v Xeetey Constr. Co. 677 P2d 
1120. 1121 (Utah 1984) ("The interest of a 
purchaser under a real estate contract is an 
interest in real property "). 
Contrary to the claims made by the dis-
sent, the Utah Supreme Court has consist-
ently applied the doctrine of equitable con-
version characterizing the seller's interest 
under an executory land sale contract as 
personal property and the buyer's interest 
as real property 2 
The Utah Supreme Court recently ap-
plied the doctrine of equitable conversion in 
determining the rights of judgment credi-
tors under an executory land sale contract 
in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P 2d 1244 
(Utah 1987). In Butler, the court squarely 
held that the buyer's interest under the 
executory land sale contract was an inter-
est in real property to which judgment hens 
cou)d attach. Justice Stewart stated: "The 
doctrine of equitable conversion character-
izes the seller's interest as an interest in 
personalty and not as one in realty, where-
intent of the parties." We disagree with the 
dissent's reading of this case. The Utah Su-
preme Court in Reynolds did not utilize the 
doctrine of equitable conversion because the 
case focused on abandonment of contractual 
rights not equitable conversion Id. at 594. 
i ; j S ( ) T - " ^ h >h P 11 mi I'm n i in i id 1 i in ««f Kl L> 
as the vendee's interest ui ider the exec-
utory contract is deemed an interest in 
realty." Id. at 1255. Furtner clarifying 
the doctrine of equitable conversion as it 
affects judgment creditors, he continued; 
I'nder the doctrine of equitable <'o[:wr-
s".'»n. a vendee under a uniform rea» es-
tate contract ot.tains an equitable inter-
est in the land ;t>eif. even though the 
vendor retains the legal title. The 
vendee is said to convert the monetary 
interest that he has in the property to an 
interest in real estate so that he may 
invoke the powers of an equity court to 
compel specific performance of the real 
estate contract. By a parity of reason-
ing, the vendor under such a rtoitrawf 
is deemed to hare ronrerted his interest 
in 'he land that is fhe suhjert of the 
contract to a monetary or legal interest 
Id. at n. 5 temphasis added >. Tl u • court 
further detailed the nature of the interest 
retained by the .seller under a land s; ue 
contract, stating: 
Under an installment land sale con-
tract, the cendor retains legal title as 
security for the purchase price of the 
property. Oaks c. Kendall. 23 Cal. 
App.2d 715. 73 P.2d 1255 {1937}; Marks 
c. City of Tucumean, 93 N.M. 4. 595 
P.2d 1199 <1979). Nevertheless, as a 
general proposition, the vendee is treated 
as the owner of the land. . . . 
The vendor's interest is similar to the 
security interest of a purchase money 
mortgagee. 
Id. at 1254-55 (emphasis added). 
The supreme court, in Butler concluded 
the buyer under a binding executory land 
sale contract has an interest in real proper-
ty to which judgment liens may attach as 
to any other real property interest but sub-
ject to the seller's prior lien. "By a parity 
of reasoning," the court concluded that the 
seller's interest under the contract is mere-
ly the right to receive the proceeds under 
the contract secured by his retained legal 
title similar to the "security interest of a 
purchase money mortgagee." Id. at 1,255. 
In ButU t\ Justice Stewart relied upon 
Marks >\ t'i'u of Turn mean. 93 N.M. 4, 
595 F 2d 119H I!979I. In Marks, the New 
Mexico court applied the doctrine of eq-
uitable conversion and held that the inter-
est r^tameo hv the vendor under a land 
sale enruract is personalty ami not real 
estate anu thus that a judgment docketed 
bv a • 'realtor .>f the seller during the exec-
utory pert* >d of the contract had no effect 
on the interest of a subsequent purchaser 
oi the prop* Ttv, 595 P.2d 1201-02. 
[21 The dissent, claims Butler supports 
its holding that a judgment hen docketed 
against the seder's interest under a uni-
b >rm real estate contract survives as a lien 
against the land even though all proceeds 
have previously been paid to the judgment 
deb tor-seder under the contract and the 
property has been deeded to a subsequent 
purchaser for value. We disagree. The 
dissent relies on the following language 
from B er: "Ithe seller has] a contract 
right to „ . take back the vendee's inter-
ests if the vendee defaults. The vendor 
also has an interest measured by the 
amount the vendee owes under the con-
tract." Butler, 740 P„2d at 1255 (citation 
omitted). This language is consistent with 
our view of the nature of the seller's re-
tained interest, not the dissent's. The sell-
er has retained legal title as security to 
insure that he or she receives the payments 
due under the contract; if the buyer should 
default, the seller's title will not be re-
leased to the buyer. This is the extent of 
the seller's retained interest—which, under 
the doctrine of equitable conversion, is not 
in the nature of real property such that 
hens can attach under section 7S-22-1. 
This court's recent decision in Lach v. 
Deseret Bank, "46 P.2d 802 (Utah Ct.App. 
1987), adopts our reading of Butler, In 
dicta, this court concluded that a judgment 
lien docketed against a seller's interest un-
der a uniform real estate contract did not 
affect the rights of the buyer under that 
contract. Id. at 805. Our language that 
"no judgment lien can be created by a 
judgment docketed against a seller after 
CANNEFAX v 
Cite as 78* P 2d 137: 
the seller executes a binding earnest mon-
ey contract." id., however, needs amplifica-
tion. The docketed judgment does not be-
come a lien under the statute because the 
seller's retained legal title is nut real prop-
erty. 
We believe I tan authority supports the 
following analysis of this case. The Bark-
ers entered into a uniform real estate con-
tract to sell the Lockhart Road Property to 
Ms. Hodge before the Clements docketed 
their judgment. Under the doctrine of eq-
uitable conversion, the Barkers retained 
only bare le r^ai title to the property as 
security to receive the payment of the pro-
ceeds due from Ms. Hodge under the con-
tract. Thus, the Clements' docketed judg-
ment did not create a judgment lien against 
the Lockhart Road Property. 
The three jurisdictions relied upon by the 
dissent. Nebraska. Idaho and Oregon, have 
held that a judgment creditor of a contract 
seller will be given a lien in the property to 
the extent of the unpaid amounts due un-
der the contract. Monroe v. Lincoln City 
Employees Credit Union, 203 Neb. 702. 
279 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1979); First Sec. 
Bank r. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 
386, 389 (1967): Heidcr v. Diet:, 234 Or. 
105. 380 P.2d 619. 624 (1963) (en banc). 
This rule has been qualified, however, to 
allow a purchaser to continue to make pay-
ments pursuant to his contract until he is 
given actual notice of the judgment lien. 
The buyer is not required to search the 
records before he makes his payments un-
der the contract. Lacy. Creditors of Land 
Contract Vendors, 24 Case W. Res. L. Re v. 
645, 647 (1973) [hereinafter "Lacy. 24 Case 
W.Res.L.Rev. 645"]; Simpson. Legislative 
Changes in the Law of Equitable Conver-
sion by Contract, 44 Vaie L.J. 559, 578 
(1935) [hereinafter "Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 
559"]. Furthermore, any lien acquired by 
the judgment creditor is "discharged by 
payment of the balance of the purchase 
money due although less than the amount 
of the judgment." Id.; see also 3 Am.Law 
Real Property § 11.29. at 86 (A. Casner ed. 
1952) [hereinafter "3 Am.Law Real Proper-
ty"]. 
CLEMENT Utah 1381 
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Thus, not even the "ruie" relied u:»on by 
the dissent supports its position. There are 
no facts in the record to support a finding 
that Ms. Htxige had actual notice ...f the 
''lements' judgment before ^he paid a:l pro-
ceeds due the Barkers as seiier- .;:.d».*r the 
contract. 
Furthermore, the ruie relied up«»n r»y the 
dissent is not the majority ruie. nor the 
ruie in L'tah. The following jurisdictions 
have held that a judgment lien against the 
seller's interest is not an encumbrance on 
the buyer's property interest under a land 
sale contract: Marks v. City or' Tuvnm-
can. W N.M. 4. 595 P.2a ILM. 1202 (1979); 
Mueller r. Xovclty Dye Works, 273 Wis. 
5<)1. 7s N.W.2d *bl. S>4 (1956): Sleeker v. 
Snyder, l ib Colo. 153. 193 P.2d 881. 884 
1194b); Snow Bros. Hardware Co. v. Ellis, 
i>o Ark. 238. 21 S.W.2d 162. 163 (1929): 
see also Simpson. 44 Yale L.J. 559. 579 nn. 
132. 133 and ca>es cited therein. 
More importantly, all of these vintage 
cases dealing with creditor's rights under 
an executory land sale contract turned on 
the peculiar facts presented and do not 
undertake a reasoned discussion of the ap-
plication of the doctrine of equitabie con-
version in dealing with third party credi-
tors. Of more assistance are the commen-
tators who have written on the topic. 
These commentators criticize the approach 
taken by the dissent and approve the one 
advocated herein. 
Discussing the conceptual framework 
created by the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion in the judgment creditor context, one 
author states: 
The rights of creditors of the vendor or 
purchaser to reach the interest of their 
debtor in the land contracted to be sold 
or purchased depend in large part on the 
theory of equitable conversion. Since on 
that theory, the purchaser is regarded as 
owner of the land and debtor for the 
purchase money and the vendor as hold-
ing legal title as security for payment by 
the purchaser, it logically follows that 
creditors of the purchaser should be able 
to reach the land subject to the vendor's 
1382 *~Ttah im P U i F I f REPORTER 2d SERIES 
lien thereon, while creditors of the ven-
dor should he able to reach the land 
only to the extent of the vendor's secur-
ity interest. 
3 Am.Law Real Property § 11.29. at 88 
(emphasis added). See also McClintock on 
Equity § 106, at 286. 
Several commentators have explicitly en-
dorsed the cases that refuse to allow a 
vendor's judgment creditors to acquire a 
lien as against the purchaser under an ex-
ecutory land sale contract even though the 
purchase price is unpaid and the purchaser 
has actual knowledge of the judgment lien. 
3 Am.Law Real Property § 11.29, at 86; 
Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559. 579; Lacy, 24 
Case W.Res.L.Rev. 645, 662. "This works 
no injustice upon the creditors, who may 
proceed by garnishment to reach the pur-
chase money or by bill for equitable execu-
tion to reach both purchase money and 
vendor's lien." 3 Am.Law Real Property 
§ 11.29, at 86. Another commentator 
states: 
[I]t is difficult to set rchaser's 
knowledge of a judg st . . . his 
vendor, should impose upon mm the ne-
cessity of paying otherwise than in ac-
cordance with his contract. Some courts 
>-" .^e:d. and, it would seem with sound 
r
*at the vendor's judgment credi-
j
 no lien as against the pur-
... . -., though the purchase price is 
unpaid and the purchaser knows of the 
i-V^^nt This works no injustice on 
-» •-editor, who may proceed by gar-
nishment to reach the purchase money or 
by bill for equitable execution to reach 
both purchase money and thp wndnr 
lien, 
Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 579 (footnotes 
omitted). 
Still another scholar concludes that even 
if one considers that the seller's judgment 
creditors lien can attach, the creditor 
should not have any right to receive pay-
ments upon mere attachment of a judg-
ment lien but only upon an execution sale. 
Lacy, 24 Case W.Res.LRev. 645, 662, 
The dissent also alludes to several policy 
considerations which it claims support, its 
holding. We discuss each in turn. The 
dissent rejects application of the doctrine of 
equitable conversion under a uniform real 
estate contract claiming that it "is hardly 
what most parties to a real estate sale 
contract have in mind. The more straight-
forward notion of such a contract envisions 
the land as changing hands only after the 
price is paid." However, executory land 
sale contracts are used by and are general-
ly intended by the parties as long-term 
financing devices similar to mortgages or 
trust deeds. Therefore, it is not inconsist-
ent that the effect of a judgment docketed 
against the seller under a uniform real 
estate contract should be the same as one 
docketed against a mortgagee or trust deed 
beneficiary. Furthermore, there are abso-
lutely no facts to support the dissent's view 
of the parties' intentions in this case. The 
dissent candidly admits that the Barkers 
did not intend that their judgment creditors 
could acquire a supenor position to their 
buyer, Ms. Hodge, under the uniform, real 
estate contract. 
The dissent further admits that ' - ca-
bling creditors to have access to the seller s 
title to the property may lessen somewhat 
the predictability of real estate transac-
tions." However, it answers this concern 
by chiding Professor Langdell and his disci-
ri"" for espousing certainty and predict-
a».uty m -ega: doctrmes. We believe there 
is no better place *>-r Professor Langdell's 
'iejjal geometry ' *nd predictability thar n 
tne transfer of real property and its **:*' - -
on mnocent tnird parties who must .-v-
-ome bngnt iin«- *  *-
The dissent «•••::»-, ;.<ies the problems cre-
ated for contra.-* r . \ers by its rale are not 
substantial as "a prudent buyer can still 
assure his title by checking the judgment 
docket to determine if creditors' claims ex-
ist "" We believe the dissent places an un-
reasonable burden on the buyer, one that 
for practical purposes wi.il destroy the com-
mercial feasibility of property sales by 
long term contracts. Under the dissent's 
view, a buyer would be required to check 
the judgment docket before .making each 
CANNEFAX v. 
Cite M 786 ?2d 1377 
monthly payment to the seller. We believe 
the burden is more equitably placed on the 
judgment creditor who can enforce his 
judgment under Utah R.Civ.P. 64C. 64D or 
69. 
Finally, we do not see how the "equi-
ties/* as claimed by the dissent, are with 
the Clements as judgment creditors in this 
case. The issue is not whether the Clem-
ents should have recourse on their judg-
ment but rather the procedural form of 
their remedy and the person who can be 
compelled to satisfy their judgment. It 
was the Clements who sat on their rights 
failing to pursue their remedies. It is not 
inequitable that as a result they cannot 
collect their judgment against a subsequent 
innocent purchaser.3 
In conclusion, we reverse the summary 
judgment granted to the Clements and or-
der the trial court to enter summary judg-
ment in favor of the Cannefaxes quieting 
title to the Lockhart Road Property in 
them. 
JACKSON, Judge (concurring): 
The doctrine of equitable conversion runs 
counter to some real property law concepts 
and my law practice observations of the 
expectations of parties to real estate deals. 
If I had been involved in the decisions to 
take the route leading to adoption of the 
doctrine, I would not have favored the trip. 
At this point, there is no junction, and the 
principle of stare decisis requires that we 
continue the journey until our supreme 
court chooses to change course. In the 
meantime, we need to maintain a stable 
direction in the law for the benefit of those 
involved in real estate transactions. 
J. ROBERT BULLOCK, Senior 
District Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. As a general 
proposition, I do not have great difficulty 
3. There are no allegations that the Cannefaxes 
as buyers acted in bad faith in purchasing the 
property at issue. For cases where "sweetheart" 
contractual deals are entered into to defraud 
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in applying the doctrine of equitable con-
version to the buyer's interest under a in-
stallment land sale contract. I do, how-
ever, have insurmountable difficulty in ap-
plying it to the seller's interest to the ex-
tent that the purchase price is unpaid, 
which is the result under the majority opin-
ion. I would, therefore, hold precisely op-
posite to my esteemed colleagues and af-
firm the district court. 
This case was heard in the district court 
on stipulated facts and dismissed on a mo-
tion for summary judgment. From the lim-
ited scope of those proceedings, the single 
issue before the district court and on ap-
peal is whether a contract seller's retained 
title is real property to which judgment 
creditors' liens can attach pursuant to sec-
tion 78-22-1 to the extent of the unpaid 
price, or whether that title is personalty by 
reason of the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion, to which judgment creditors' liens 
cannot attach. The majority's conclusion 
that the seller's retained title is personalty 
appears to me to be contrary to the case 
law generally, to run counter to public poli-
cy, to presume facts not in evidence, and is 
based upon grounds never argued here or 
below. I respectfully opine that the majori-
ty misinterprets the applicable case law in 
Utah and most other jurisdictions and 
reaches a result that has nothing to recom-
mend it in terms of public policy, other 
than the pursuit of purely theoretical sym-
metry, that is to say, that if the buyer's 
interest might be regarded as personal 
property, then it invariably must follow for 
reasons of symmetry that the seller's inter-
est is personal property, even though the 
seller has not been fully paid and has not 
parted with title. I explain first how the 
majority's opinion conflicts with the rele-
vant Utah cases, and then turn to consider-
ations of public policy. 
Utah Case Law on Equitable Conversion 
A Utah appellate court has never square-
ly held, until this case, that a judgment 
creditors, there is a remedy available under the 
Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 25-6-1 to -13 (1989). 
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against the seller and duly docketed as 
section 78-22-1 provides does not create a 
lien against the seller's Segal title to land 
agreed to be sold under an executory in-
stallment contract because the seller's re-
tained title was not. real property.. There 
are cases in which the Supreme Court has 
relied on the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion in very different contexts; for exam-
ple, in holding that the seller of property 
later condemned was entitled only to the 
contract amount' or in holding that the 
seller's mterest was taxable as personal 
property.2 However, the interests at stake 
in estate taxation and eminent domain are 
very different from those at stake in debt-
or-creditor relations, and the majority's ref-
erences to dicta restating the notion of 
equitable conversion in such cases provide 
no compelling reason for applying eq-
uitable conversion to preclude a judgment 
lien. The purely obiter recitations of the 
general concept of equitable conversion are 
no authority for applying it here. Mere 
definition of a concept does not justify its 
application; we could as well define a judg-
ment lien and thereupon insist on vindicat-
ing the lien in this case, 
The most thorough elucidation to date by 
the Utah Supreme Court of the scope and 
of equitable conversion is found, in 
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
A footnote in Butler at page 1255, 
quoted in the majority opinion, defines the 
concept of equitable conversion, and it is 
upon that definition that the majority prin-
* cipally relies. However, Butler stops far 
l Jelco. inc. v. Third Judicial District >uri ?Q 
L i a n 2d 4 7 2 , 511 P 2d ^39 • I<37*; 
^illson v State J ax Commission .> 
- ' 4^9 P.2d 1298 i I9T2-
* ~iut!er accordingly squares with the law of 
- jurisdictions that, have considered the 
question. See, e.g.. First Security Bank v. Rog-
ers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 386 (1967) ('The 
majority rule is that a judgment lien against a 
vendor after the making of the contract of sale 
extends to all of the vendor's mterest remaining 
in the land and binds the land to the extent of 
the unpaid purchase price.); Heider v. Deitz. 234 
Or. 105, 380 P.2d 619 (1963). This majority rule 
is further discussed later in this opinion, 
4, 740 P.2d at 1255 • 56. 
short, of requiring equitable conversion in 
every conceivable instance, and, in my 
analysis of it, concludes contrary to the 
majority opinion in this case/1 Butler 
clearly holds that the buyer's interest, is 
real property to which a judgment lien at-
taches subject, to the seller's retained legal 
title,4 but it is not all-encompassing in forc-
ing universal adoption and application of 
the "parity of reasoning" for which the 
majority contends. The main point of the 
majority opinion seems to be that, because 
the buyer's interest is real property, the 
seller's interest must "logically" be person-
al property. However. Butler's, descrip-
tion of the "parity of reasoning," the logi-
cal symmetry that underlies equitable con 
version, is not an unqualified, universal 
endorsement of it. 
Butler's general, introductory restate-
ment of the concept of equitable conversion 
is, according to Butler itself,, not a univer-
sal verity that must be applied slavishly in 
every conceivable instance, without regard 
to the merits of such an application. But-
ler recognizes that equitable conversion re-
• ults m a characterization of the buyer that 
\s :>-: 'A.r-oii\ accurate,."'5 and further 
".iite* "hat suitable conversion does not 
;-reven* a judgment docketed against the 
seller from becoming a lien on the seller's 
title to the land * 
After stating ;.;at judgment creditors" 
:ens against a Oliver's equitable contractu-
j : mterest are not extinguished by an "as-
Menm*-''.!. »aie or rescission," the Butler 
Ju i*. , 2 ^ Butler further notes that 
.jui:jbie conversion operates to treat the buyer 
»- ov\ner oi" the land only "as a general proposi-
.on.' I recognize that in many situations, it 
lakes good sense to regard the prospective, 
conditional performance of the contract as if it 
were an accomplished fact: however, this case 
does not, present such a situation:.. 
6. "[A] .udgment ien against the vendor's inter-
est [is not] ?*: nsruisned b\ the vendor's sale of 
that .- teres: * • • : xrv-n " 740 P.2d at 
1258. 
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opinion continues: "Nor for that matter, is our inquiry. 
a judgment lien against the vendor's inter-
est extinguished by the vendor's sale of 
that interest to a third person." : The 
Clements argue, and I agree, that this 
statement clearly shows that the Supreme 
Court considers the seller's retained title to 
be real property, since judgment liens at-
tach only to real property, not to personal 
property, pursuant to section 78-22-1. 
The majority views the seller's interest 
as. at most, a lien. In this regard, it is true 
that Butler analogizes the seller's interest 
to a purchase money mortgage, but Butler 
is careful to point out it is really no mere 
lien; rather, it is legal title to the land, 
albeit subject to a conditional promise to 
convey at a future date.8 Legal title to 
land is not only within the definition and 
plain meaning of "real property" in section 
78-22-1, but also it is the very archetype of 
what real property is.9 
Butler clearly recognizes that the seller 
retains legal title, and that is where the 
analytical usefulness of the analogy to a 
lien ends. The seller's retained legal title 
is indeed similar to a lien or mortgage, in 
that it permits the seller to regain the land 
if the buyer defaults. However, the fact 
that the retained title may function like a 
lien in certain circumstances is far from 
saying that it is identical or equivalent to a 
lien for all purposes.10 We do not have a 
case here in which a seller recovers proper-
ty from a delinquent buyer, and therefore, 
the lien analogy has little utility in this 
particular situation. Rather, this is a case 
in which a third party seeks to realize a 
judgment out of the seller's asset, and the 
legal nature of that asset is the object of 
LTtan 1 3 8 5 
In this context, it is quite 
immaterial that the buyer could lose his 
interest in a forfeiture that in some ways 
operates as a lien foreclosure. What is 
important for present purposes is that the 
Barkers held legal title, and. although they 
had agreed to part with it at a later date if 
Hodge performed her obligations, they still 
held legal title when the Clements docketed 
their judgment. Consistent with Butler, a 
judgment lien would therefore attach to 
that title to the extent of the unpaid bal-
ance of the contract price. 
In respectful contrast to Judge Jackson's 
concurring opinion, I am convinced that 
stare decisis does not compel the result 
reached by the majority. Dicta in Lack v. 
Deseret Banku may have expressed a 
view on the subject, but dicta are not hold-
ing, and only a holding of the court need be 
followed under the principle of stare deci-
sis.12 The precise question that is squarely 
presented in this case was an open question 
in Utah case law until this case. The prior 
adoption in our case law of the general 
notion of equitable conversion does not 
mean that it must apply in this case; when-
ever a doctrine of such broad scope is em-
braced, it must be fine-tuned and excep-
tions must be carved out to prevent injus-
tice in the many varied applications of the 
doctrine. Some of the limitations on eq-
uitable conversion were explained in the 
Butler case, and in the case before us now, 
Butler clearly indicates that equitable con-
version should not be applied here. 
Deficiencies in Rationale 
This is the first time a Utah appellate 
court has squarely held that a docketed 
7. Butler, 740 P.2d at 1258 (emphasis added). 
8. See 740 P.2d at 1256 a. 6. 
9. See Restatement of Property § 10 comment c 
(1936). 
10. Justice Stewart clearly recognized the limita-
tions of the lien analogy in the Butler opinion 
when he wrote: 'The term 'vendor's lien' seems 
to have stuck even though it is inaccurately used 
before the vendor parts with the title. Until 
then, it is not, in fact, a lien at ail, but rather a 
retained interest in the land that is derived from 
the vendor's retention of the fee title." 740 P.2d 
at 1256 n. 6. 
11. 746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1988). 
12. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 74 Utah 103. 277 P. 206, 210 (1929); 
Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533. 216 P. 234, 
236-37 (1923). 
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judgment does n< -* a> d ^r >,ra nst tr.e 
seller's retained title to real propern jni-r 
a contract of sale. Since we here lay down 
a precedent, I think it is important to exam-
ine the rationale and public-policy impacts 
of that holding, 
The doctrine of nquiuble conversion is 
the notion that the seller of a specifically 
enforceable contract to convey land is 
deemed to own primarily l3 an interest in 
personal property, and the buyer's interest 
under the contract is characterized as real 
property.14 However, while that notion 
leads to a sensible result in some situa-
tions, it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that such a characterization of the 
parties' interests is not generally what they 
have in mind. The more straightforward 
notion of such a contract envisions the land 
as changing hands only after the pnce is 
paid; until then, the seller still owns the 
land and. the buyer is in the unfulfilled 
process of acquiring it.is In order to un-
derstand why a legal doctnne such as eq 
uitable conversion could be acknowledged 
at all when its effect is to transform realty 
into personalty, automatically and in dis-
regard of the intention of the parties, a 
brief excursus in', J our legal history may 
be helpful, 
The English common law developed 
along 'the lines of certain specific "writs" 
issued by the king's courts to' address cer-
13. The "bare legal title" retained by the seller is 
sometimes said to be held in trust for the buyer, 
see, e,g., In re Highberger's Estate, 468 Pa. 120, 
360 A.2d 580 (1976); In re Krotzsch's Estate, 60 
IH.2d 342, 326 N.E.2d 758 (1975); Smith v, 
Tang, 100 Ariz. 196, 412 P.2d 697 (1966), or to 
be a constructive lien to secure payment of the 
price, see Oaks v. Kendall, 23 Cal.App.2d 715, 73 
P.2d 1255. 1258-59 (1937). The term "lien," 
however, is actually something of a misnomei , 
as the "Utah Supreme Court explained in Butlet , 
740 P.2d at 1256 n. 6: 
The term "vendor's Hen" is inaccui ately 
used before the vendor parts with the title. 
Until then, it is not. in fact, a lien at all, but 
rather a retained interest in the land that is 
derived from the vendor's retention, of the fee 
title. 
14. See genera H> 3 American La*. 
62-64 (Casner ed 'Q*2* R fun-
Stoebuck £ 
*a:i <^\:w Ar.-ngb Pursuant to an early 
^ututp, problems that did not fit within the 
.,c<»pe *f ar ~v:sting writ could not be 
remedied by the king's courts, although the 
courts in time became somewhat adept at 
stretching the scope of the prescribed writs 
by analogy.16. Still, many grievances, such 
as a simple breach of a contract, for exam-
pie, were for centuries not effectively re-
solved by the ngid. stultified rules of the 
common law',,17 
When relief was not available at common 
law for a perceived wrong, the aggrieved 
person at first petitioned the king directly 
to intervene and do justice. The kings 
came to refer such petitions to their chan-
cellors to be decided according to con-
science and equity, rather than by the rigid 
rules of the common law. The chancellors 
eventually developed a system, of courts, 
procedure, and substantive law separate' 
from the common law, which came to be 
known b\ the word "equity." 
One of the remedies commonly employed 
by the courts of equity was specific per-
formance, an order directing the defendant 
to perform a specific act in furtherance of 
a ( ontractual obligation. In a contract for 
tne -^ aie of land, a recalcitrant seller could 
- -le-^fi in equity to specifically perform 
me j.-rr-ra^t that is, to actually convey the 
land. I* "t! failed to do so, he could be 
penalize-.: for 'or^empt,18 
695-701 (1984); H. McClintock, McCUntock on 
Equity 284-38 (1948); 4 J. Pomeroy k S. Sym-
ons, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence 472-SO 
(1941); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Ju-
risprudence 485-92 (1918). 
15. 3A A. Corbm, Corbtn on Contracts 19,3-94 
(1960). 
16 D. Dobbs, Remedies 28-35 (1978). 
17. Id.; L Fuller & M. Eisenberg, Basic Conn act 
Law 63^)6 (1972). 
18. The earliest origins of equitable conversion 
have been traced to trust concepts, independent 
of specific performance. Davis, The Origin of 
the Doctnne of Equitable Conversion by Contract 
25 KyLJ ^8 < 1^36); Simpson, Legislative 
Changes w 'he Uaw- ot Equitable Conversion by 
• " — J . ' - • ! < - : ; 559 n 3 (1935). The 
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One of the time-honored maxims of equi-
ty was that it "regards as done that which 
ought to be done." Applying this maxim to 
land sale contracts came to mean that if 
specific performance could be granted on 
the contract, the contract could be con-
sidered as if it had been fully performed. 
The seller could therefore be treated as 
having conveyed the property and received 
the price, and the buyer as having received 
the property. The seller was therefore 
deemed in equity to hold personal property, 
and the buyer, real property. This deem-
ing was. of course, a legal fiction; the 
contract was fully performed only in the 
chancellor's imagination. The reality was 
that a deed would be delivered and the 
seller would consider himself no longer the 
owner when the sale had been consummat-
ed by receipt of the full price.19 
When the English legal tradition was 
transplanted to America, the doctrine of 
equitable conversion came along with it. 
In 1905, the American legal scholar Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell systematized it 
elaborately, and it almost seems as if Lang-
deli placed his philosophical mark upon the 
doctrine, making it into a "legal geometry" 
or a "heaven of juristic conceptions.' 20 
For Langdell, law was a science, whose 
data in the English tradition were the prior 
decisions of courts.21 To the legal scien-
tist, cloistered in the library that was his 
current formulation of the doctrine, however, is 
firmly linked to the specific enforceability of 
the contract, perhaps due to the oft-cited formu-
lation by Lord Eldon in a case seeking specific 
performance, Seton v. Slade, 7 VesJun. 265 
(1802). 
19. The fictional character of the rule is apparent 
in the fact that equity would not invoke it to 
give the purchaser any real incidents of owner-
ship before the time set for performance. H. 
McCfintock, McCtintock on Equity 295 (1948). 
20. 3 American Law of Property 64 (Casner, ed., 
1952). 
21. Address by C.C. Langdell delivered Novem-
ber 5, 1886, reprinted in Law Quarterly Review 
123, 124 (1887). 
22. For example, Langdell noted in his casebook 
on contracts that the "mailbox rule" holding 
laboratory, it was irrelevant whether the 
rule extracted from the cases produced a 
result that was in reality unjust or at odds 
with common sense. What mattered was 
not whether the rule was a good one but 
rather whether it was the rule.--
This rather mechanistic, wholly abstract 
view of the law has fallen upon evil days in 
recent decades. Sociological jurisprudence 
and legal realism waged a war of commen-
tary on the application of fixed rules with-
out regard to fairness in an individual case 
or to social policy. In particular, equitable 
conversion came to be explained as a 
"name given to results reached on other 
grounds." zz No longer was it a set of 
substantive rules describable in clauses be-
ginning with "if" and "then"; rather, it 
was simply a shorthand method of describ-
ing what came after the "then." There 
was still little thought of adding an express 
"because . . . , " or of explaining the reasons 
for either the substantive rule or the result 
in a specific case. 
This inattention to the reasons for eq-
uitable conversion led to some roundhouse 
critiques of the doctrine. Harlan Stone 
debunked it in a 1913 article.-4 Several 
other writers also denounced, and uniform 
legislation was proposed to counteract, its 
effect of placing the risk of casualty loss 
on the buyer during the executory period.25 
Some cases hedged in relying on the eq-
that acceptance is effective on dispatch, regard-
less of whether it is received, had been criticized 
as leading to unjust and absurd results. 'The 
true answer" to that criticism was, according to 
Langdell, "that it is irrelevant." C.C. Langdell, 
A Selection of Coses on the Law of Contracts 
995-96 (2d ed. 1879). 
23. Pound. The Progress of the Law, 33 Harv.L. 
Rev. 813, 832 (1920); see also Stone, Equitable 
Conversion by Contract, 13 CoIum.L.Rev. 369 
(1913). 
24. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 
Coium.L.Rev. 369 (1913). 
25. E.g., Vannemann, Risk of Loss in Equity be-
tween the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate 
and Transfer of Title, 8 Minn.L.Rev. (1924); 
Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory 
Contract of Sale in the Common Law, 9 Harv.L. 
Rev. 106 (1895). 
1388 LTtah ?86 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
uitable conversion doctrine, declaring that 
it would be invoked only when it led to a 
fair result.-' Contrary to the majority's 
claim, my thorough reading of the modern 
commentary on equitable conversion gener-
ally reveals little enthusiasm for universal 
application of the doctrine and no per-
suasive reasoning to support its application 
in this case. 
The scholarly criticism of the blind appli-
cation of the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion has, however, been only partially suc-
cessful in preventing its misuse in the 
courts. Leading commentators have re-
cently noted that "decisions [on equitable 
conversion] often seem adamant in their 
unwillingness to discuss the underlying pol-
icy issues; equitable conversion almost be-
comes a substitute for thinking about the 
real questions in the case." r' There is no 
justification for ignoring what is actually 
happening in a case and what the parties' 
clash of interests is really all about. In-
voking a talisman such as "equitable con-
version" to give a name and ostensible 
legitimacy to a rule without a rationale is a 
jurisprudential cop-out, and exposes society 
to potential danger from rules that have 
drifted from their public policy moorings. 
In my opinion, courts have a responsibility 
to continually scrutinize the law we apply, 
26. E.g., Clay v. Undreth, 187 Va. 169, 45 S.E.2d 
875 (1948); In re Seiferts Estate, 109 N.H. 62. 
242 A.2d 64, 33 A.L.R.3d 1276 (1967); National 
Bank of Topeka v. Saia, 154 Kan. 740, 121 P.2d 
251 (1942). 
27. R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, 
The Law of Property 699 (1984). 
28. See Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 
P.2d 1281. 1285-86 (Utah 1987); B. Cardozo, 
The Nature of the Judicial Process 98-142 (1921). 
Holmes expressed both the compunctions and 
the necessity felt by a person who must dis-
charge this responsibility in saying that he "hes-
itate(s] to affirm universal validity for his social 
ideals" and "may be ready to admit that he 
knows nothing about an absolute best in the 
cosmos, and even that he knows next to nothing 
about a permanent best for men. Still it is true 
that a body of law is more rational and more 
civilized when every rule it contains is referred 
articulately and definitely to an end which it 
subserves, and when the grounds for desiring 
that end are stated or are ready to be stated in 
words." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. 
L.Rev. 457, 468-69 (1897). 
particularly judicially-created law such as 
equitable conversion, in order to weed out 
defects in the law as it has been handed 
down to us and to keep it consistent with 
evolving social policy and conditions.28 
Viewing the policies and practical rea-
sons for equitable conversion, I firmly be-
lieve that it is not a rule that should be 
applied as a matter of course in every 
instance. Rather, it describes a result in 
which the seller's interest is deemed to be 
essentially personalty and the buyer's in-
terest to be realty. In reaching that result, 
the court should endeavor, as with any 
contract, to give effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties.29 While apply-
ing equitable conversion automatically for 
every question involving a land sale con-
tract may foster easy predictability, it 
would nevertheless in many instances dis-
regard or frustrate what the parties intend-
ed their contract to accomplish, which is a 
transfer of property when it is paid for, but 
not before. The contract in this case, for 
example, clearly contemplates a transfer of 
ownership by deed after all installments 
have been paid. 
One involuntary consequence30 of the 
seller's retention of title to the property is 
that his creditors may reach it in satisfac-
29. 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 1-3 (1963); 
see also John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City 
Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987); Lund-
strom v. Radio Corp. of Am., 17 Utah 2d 114, 
405 P.2d 339 (1965); Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 
Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958). 
50. We recognize that the buyer and seller in this 
case, like most, probably did not intend for a 
judgment lien to attach to the sellers interest 
shortly before the seller conveyed to the buyer, 
and they would have precluded the lien, if that 
were possible. However, the law also recog-
nizes the rights of a party's creditors to reach 
assets in satisfaction of their judgments, without 
regard to the debtor's preferences in the matter. 
Therefore, once it is clear that they have, by 
their intent, retained a property interest, the 
rights of creditors to reach that interest operate 
without regard to what the debtor-promisor and 
his promisee may have intended. 
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tion of their claims against him. Enabling 
creditors to have access to the seller's title 
to the property is thought by the majority 
to lessen the predictability of real estate 
transactions. However, a prudent buyer 
can still assure his title by checking the 
judgment docket to determine if creditors' 
claims exist. In this and most sales, the 
buyer has recourse against the seller if 
title is encumbered, and. if the encum-
brance is serious, may rescind the sale.31 
If. however, the buyer ignores the encum-
brance, he proceeds at his peril, unless he 
can prove himself to be a bona fide pur-
chaser or invoke statutory protection such 
as the recording act.32 Neither Hodge nor 
the Cannefaxes attempted to rescind, or 
asserted that they are bona fide purchasers 
or protected under the recording act. In 
these circumstances, there is nothing 
wrong with leaving the loss to fall upon the 
buyer, who is able to discover in advance 
the faults in the title and take corrective 
action. 
In determining the legal effect of a con-
tract, therefore, the intent of the parties 33 
should carry far more weight than a legal 
fiction, however deep in tradition the fic-
tion's roots. People have a right to make 
contracts and to have their lawful contrac-
tual intentions fulfilled, and they cannot 
fairly be expected to make contracts with a 
thorough knowledge of the oblique way in 
which nine centuries of equitable jurispru-
dence may twist and "convert" the mean-
ing of their intentions.34 In holding that 
the buyer's and seller's interests are equi-
tably converted, the majority is oblivious to 
31. Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 
1984); CallLster v. Milbtream Assocs., Inc., 738 
P.2d 662 (Utah App.1987). 
32. See Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398-99 
(Utah 1983). 
33. Contrary to the majority's view, the intent of 
the parties is clear from the face of their con-
tract, and, under the parol evidence rule, extrin-
sic evidence is unnecessary and inadmissible. 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
34. Other equitable doctrines, such as estoppel, 
laches, unclean hands, etc. are not subject to 
the face of the contract itself, which pro-
vides that the seller will convey the real 
property when the price is received, and 
not before. It was undisputed that the 
price was not received when the Clements' 
judgment was docketed. 
In my view, the majority also places in-
sufficient value in the need to efficiently 
enforce judgments. They intimate that the 
Clements could have executed on their 
judgment, but ignore the fact that their 
execution was judicially restrained in this 
case. It is also unclear in Utah law that 
the Clements have anything on which they 
could execute, without a judgment lien. At 
common law, execution cannot be levied on 
a chose in action.35 and, although that com-
mon law rule has been changed by statute 
in many jurisdictions, there is no applicable 
Utah statute. Thus, by reducing the sell-
er's interest to a mere contract receivable, 
the majority leaves the judgment creditor 
without a clear, sure means of reaching the 
seller's contract interest under our law, 
other than by garnishing each payment as 
it accrues. Enforcing a duly entered judg-
ment thus becomes a cumbersome process 
of having a writ issued and served before 
each installment is paid. 
Most jurisdictions that have considered 
this question have weighed the policy con-
siderations as I do. Contrary to the asser-
tion of the majority, the scholars studying 
this question all conclude that the majority 
of jurisdictions hold that a judgment lien 
attaches to the seller's interest in a con-
tract for the sale of real property.36 
More persuasive, however, than the re-
sults of any interstate judicial poll are the 
this same criticism. Rather, they serve to carry 
into effect the fair and reasonable intentions of 
the parties. 
35. 33 CJ.S. Executions § 28 at 158-59 (1942). 
36. E.g., Monroe v. Lincoln City Employees Credit 
Union, 203 Neb. 702, 279 N.W.2d 866 (1979); 
First Security Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 
P.2d 386 (1967); Heider v. Deitz. 234 Or. 105, 
380 P.2d 619 (1963). Surveys of case law on 
point include R. Cunningham. W. Stoebuck & D. 
Whitman, The Law of Property 701 (1984); 
Lacy, Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24 
Case W.Res.L.Rev. 645, 646 (1973); 3 Am. Law 
of Property 11.29 at 85 (1952). 
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compelling needs to recognize the parties' 
contractual intent and to provide an effec-
tive means of enforcing judgments Con-
versely there is no real reason favoring 
equitable conversion in this setting other 
than perhaps a wish for abstract svmmetry 
or elegantia juris, which could incline one 
to the notion that, since the buyer has real 
property under equitable conversion princi-
ples, the seller must conversely have per-
sonal property for all purposes, including 
the attachment of judgment hens 37 How-
ever, to give way to such a wish in dis-
regard of the parties' intent and of the 
need to enforce lawful judgments is sheer 
formalism, a glorification of abstraction for 
abstraction's sake 
Potential Defenses Not Raised 
The Cannefaxes' position here and m the 
district court has consisted only of an at 
tempt to invoke equitable conversion to 
prevent the Clements' judgment hen from 
attaching The Cannefaxes have not as-
serted any defences against the enforce-
ment of the Clements' lien, once it at-
tached. Ordinarily, there would be little 
need to mention defenses never raised by 
the parties, but m this case, I believe the 
majority has, m effect, given some weight 
37. It is perhaps ironic that equitv, which began 
as an effort to overcome the constricting for 
malism of the common law writ system, came 
to have such a penchant for wholly abstract 
logical symmetry Some of this devotion to 
abstract symmetry has already been discarded, 
the old equitable doctrine of mutuality of reme 
dy for example, which held that an equitable 
remedy could be granted to the plaintiff only if 
the defendant, under like, hypothetical circum 
stances, could obtain the same remedy has 
been totally discarded Utah Mercur Gold Mm 
ing Co v Herschel Gold Mining Co, 103 Utah 
249, 134 P 2d 1094, 1097 (1943) ('The remedy of 
one should not depend upon the hypothetical 
case of what another could demand if the situa 
uon were different"), Genola Town v Santa-
gum City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P2d 930, 934 (1938) 
38. Olsen v Park Daughters Inv Co., 29 Utah 2d 
421, 511 P2d 145 (1973) 
39. May v Emerson, 52 Or 262, 96 P 454 (1908). 
Wehn v Fall, 55 Neb 547, 76 N W 13 (1898), 
see R Cunningham, W Stoebuck & D Whit 
man, The Law of Property 702 (1982), Lacy. 
to those potential defenses They pre-
sume, for example that the Cannefaxes 
are bona fide purchasers and the\ also 
view the Clements as having failed to per-
form a duty to give actual notice to the 
Cannefaxes in order to perfect in a 
sense their lien against the Cannefaxes 
However the Cannefaxes bona fides and 
lack of actual notice are unproven facts 
that might have been material to defensive 
arguments that were never raised Since 
the Cannefaxes had the burden of avoiding 
the hen in order to quiet title 38 judgment 
against them is correct even though there 
was no apparent inquiry into either actual 
notice, the Cannefaxes' knowledge of the 
judgment or lack of it, or into their bona 
fides in any respect 
As the majority also points out. several 
jurisdictions have held that the judgment 
lienor cannot recover from the buyer any 
installment payments made m the ordinary 
course of contract performance without ac-
tual notice of the existence of the judgment 
hen w These holdings are rooted in con-
cern that the buyer not be required to 
check the judgment docket every time an 
installment payment is made, such would 
be an "intolerable inconvenience " 40 In-
stead, the buyer is permitted to continue 
paying installments, which are credited 
against the pnee, until the buyer is given 
Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24 Case 
W Res L Rev at 646-47, A Freeman & E 
Turtle, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments 965 
(5th ed 1905) 
40. Mover v Hinman, 13 N Y 180(1855) Such 
concern certainly has its place in adjudication, 
and Utah case law has recognized that simple 
fairness and the equities' mav properly be con 
sidered in reaching a decision Jacobson v Ja-
cobson, 557 P 2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976), but see 
Bnggs v Uddell, 699 P2d 770 772 (Utah 1985) 
("equitable powers are narrowly bounded") 
However an unstructured, unguided inquiry 
into 'whatevers fair' invites subjectivity <md 
inconsistent, uncertain results, and the often 
elusive and ethereal nature of "fairness* would 
leave little effective means, other than litigation, 
for resolving disputes I would therefore prefer 
to see such equitable concern take a more struc 
tured form, such as laches. Under that doc 
trine, a lienor would be barred from enforcing 
the lien if the lienor delayed in asserting his 
rights while his adversary performed reason 
ably and innocently to his detriment See Bor-
land v Chandler, 733 P 2d 144 (Utah 1987) 
actual, not merely constructive, notice of 
the lien. I have no guarrel with such a 
conclusion, but there is absolutely no occa-
sion to reach it in this case, since there is 
no indication in the stipulated facts wheth-
er or not the Cannefaxes had actual notice 
of the lien at a time when they could have 
averted consummation of the sale. The 
Cannefaxes, in seel ing to quiet title 
against the Clements, had the burden of 
going forward with evidence showing that 
the lien was unenforceable.41 All section 
78-22-1 requires for a lien to attach is 
entry of the judgment and docketing in the 
proper county. The judgment creditor is 
not required to do anything more, such as 
give actual notice to a contract buyer, and 
to require more would run contrary to sec-
tion 78-22-1.42 
Conclusion 
In conclusion. I believe there is no ques-
tion but that the buyer's interest in an 
executory land sale contract may be char-
acterized as real property under the fiction 
of equitable conversion for the purpose of 
the attachment of the buyer's judgment 
creditors' liens. However, the cases, in-
cluding Butler, do not hold that because 
the buyer s interest may be considered real 
property for that purpose, it must then 
necessarily follow that the seller's retained 
title is personalty to which the liens of the 
seller's judgment creditors cannot attach. 
In my opinion, the rule to be deduced 
from Butler and the cases cited therein is 
that the seller's retained title in an install-
ment land sale contract was, is, and re-
mains real property to the extent of the 
unpaid balance of the purchase price for 
the purposes of the attachment of liens of 
the seller's judgment creditors. Further, 
by reason of the fiction of equitable conver-
sion, the buyer's interest may also be char-
acterized as real property, limited only by 
the right of the setter to receive the pur-
41. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 511 P.2d at 
146. There are several other potential argu-
ments which, in an appropriate factual setting, 
the buyer could have asserted against the lien. 
However, we have neither facts nor argument to 
enable us to determine, for example, whether 
the title company handling the closing was neg-
ligent and could have reversed the transaction 
by returning escrowed deeds and money when 
DOE v. HAFEN 
CUe M 786 ?2d 1391 (Utah App. 1990) 
Utah 1391 
chase price and the performance of other 
terms of the contract. 
I recognize that the recording statutes 
and bona fide purchaser considerations are 
significant and may be overriding in a giv-
en case.13 However, no such matters ap-
pear from the stipulated facts in this case 
and none were raised or argued in the 
district court or here on appeal. 
From the cases, as well as an examina-
tion of the historical underpinnings of the 
equitable conversion fiction, which is not a 
doctrine of universal application, I am re-
grettably compelled to respectfully dis-
agree with the majority's opinion, and I 
would affirm the trial court. 
KEY HUMBtR SYSTt ? 
Jane DOE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Shirlene HAFEN, as personal representa-
tive ad litem of the Estate of Melvin 
Reeves, Defendant and Respondent 
Jane DOE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Shirlene HAFEN, as personal representa-
tive ad litem of the Estate of Melvin 
Reeves, Defendant and Respondent. 
Nos. 870310-CA, 870514-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 16, 1990. 
Prior report: 772 P.2d 456. 
Rehearing denied. 
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it learned of the lien, or whether the Clements' 
lien is inferior in priority to the interests of 
Hodge and the Cannefaxes. 
42. Tavlor Natl Inc. v. Jensen Bros. Constr. Co., 
641 P.2d 150, 154-55 (Utah 1982). 
43. Butler, 740 P.2d 1259-40. 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate thit 2fl!i3 day of August _ _ A. D., 19—fllf, 
by and between GEORGE W. BAP.KFR. JR. and LT1A M BARKER, h i< un f A 
hereinafter deeignated at the Seller, and DIANE HQDG£ 
her.in.fur designated a. the Buyer, of S a l t Lake COUHty, S t a t e o f Utah 
2 WITNESSETH That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to tell and convey u» the buye 
and the buyer for the euiieideration herein mentioned agreet to purchase the folio*m^ described real property, situate ih 
the county of 
Salt Lake Sute of Utah, to-wit 2563 Ea§t L Q C ^ r t ROfl<3 
Aooacaa 
More particularly deeenbed at followt: 
SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND MADE A PART OF THIS CONTRACT 
3. Said Buyer hereby agreet to enter into pottettion and pay for taid described premises the turn of . 
r,NP miNhprn srrrv THmsAr-.r, ANH an/mo
 0 o l U r . tt 160.000.QQ [• 
payable at the office of Seller, his attignt or order -
strictly within the following timet, tcwit: FORTY THOUSAND ANn Nf)/1Q0 i t40 .000 .00 
cash, the receipt of which it hereby acknowledged, and the balance of f l?f l tnnn 00 «Ka>ll be paid at followi 
SEE EXHIBIT MBM ATTACHED HERETO AND MADE A PART OF THIS CONTRACT 
Possession of said premises thai) be delivered to buyer on the 2nd day of September
 § ia 81 
4. Said monthly payments arc to be applied firtt to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of tM 
principal Interest shall be charged from ., Sfiptgfllftfir Z% 19fil on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rata of Ft FVFN par cent ( _ L L _ " r ) per annum The Buyer, at his option at anytime 
may pay amount* in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limkutione of any murine*** 
or contract by the Buyer herein ansumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of futute-
installments at the election of the buyer, which election mutt be made at the time the eicets payment it made I 
fi« It is understood and agreed that if the Sailer accepts payment from the Buyer on thts contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract at to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or aa to any other remedies of the teller. j 
I. It it understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of PRUDENTIAL ' 
rrnrpfli SAVTNHS A I HAM a ^ n r T A T M M *nH THE MNTTNENTAI RANK ANn T P I L « .QQMPA^^^ j ( 
i 12s8QQ,QQ*and J46.QQQ.QPf» of August. 1 . 19fll (**w™^mAt* h>y>nr*<) , 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to »*idf»%)£)1 
iscs now tn the process of b«ing installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said propV *" 
erty, except the following NQNF \ — _ _ ^ — « _ ^ » « _ 
K. The Seller ts given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed tie 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed ELr^ Y^N, 
. p«rce< at 
( 11 .-'< ) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments, provided that the agrregata monthly Inatatlmelt 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not b« greater than each installment payment required is 
made b> the Buyer under this vuntrect Vr nen the principal due hereunder ftas been reduced to the amount of any sue., 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages 
V. If the Buyer detiret to exercise hit right through accelerated payments under thit agreement to pay off any ob . 
gauone outstanding at date of thit agreement againtt taid property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume aid 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligation*. Prepayment penalties in respett 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by taller unlets 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer | 
20. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of iu)h 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of taid lender and hereby agreet to apply any amount so received up<j 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses •pessary in ob-
taining said lo«n, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that *w payments aid 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest r*** - T 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kir iy be assess la 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this ag ts and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the followini 
£ijQii£ 
r v? f i n t T 
d 
The Seller further covenants and agrees thot he will not da fault lo the pa., ___________ Id pro pari 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after . January 1, 1981 
13. The Buyer further afreet to keep all Insurable buildings and improvements on said premises Insured in a eoml 
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not Icaa than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $ _ _ _ 1 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller aa hit interest* may appear and U deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buytr shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessment or insurance 
premium* at herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessrnenu and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elect* to to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per 
month until paid. | 
16. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he wilt maintain said premises in good condition. 
14. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to makl 
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within "^U"*_ days thereafter, tha 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies. 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written no tic 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which havfc 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages tJr 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agreea that the Seller may at his option re-enter and lakk 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in ita first and former estate, together with all impruv 
ments and additiona made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller, i 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including eosta and attorneys 
(••». (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resomn|c 
to one of the other remeoies hereunder in the event of a subaequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at hia option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaii 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contiact as a note and mortgage, and pais 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws df 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owinf 
including eosts and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remai 
In the ca»e of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled i 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rente, issues ai^ i 
profits therefrom ami apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuat 
to order of the court, and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the posset*it 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
Id. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances againat aaid premises other than those herein provided for 
T9t9rrt4 to, or in the event any hens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against tri 
same by ecu or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at hia option, pay and discharge the same and receive cred 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pai 
menu herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time aa such suspended 
•payments shall equal any sums advanced aa aforeaaid. 
19. The Sejler on receiving the payments herein reserved to bo paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the Utle to ttfe 
above described premises fr*t and clear of al) encumbrances except aa herein mentioned and except aa may have accrue*! 
by or through the acta or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at hie expense, a policy of title insurance in the emoui 
of the purchaae pnee or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during tM 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It it hereby expreasly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
In ita present condition and that there are no representation*, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto wi0 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto Seller warrants that a 
heating, plumbing, electrical to be in good condition at time of possession. 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenant* or agreement* contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all cost* and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It ta understood that the stipulations aforeaaid are to apply to and bind the heir*, executors, administrator*. su^ < 
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their name*, the day and yit 
first above written. 
Slued in the presence of / / ' ' ' / \ 
4~ George W. Barker, Jr. 
c U U M. Barker 






















Exhibit MAM attached hereto and made a part of that Unifonn Real Estate 
Contract by and between George W. Barker, Jr. and Li la M. Barker, his 
wife, as Seller and Diane Hodge, as Buyer, dated August 28, 1981. 
$5,000.00 or more due and payable on or before September 2, 1982. 
$1,363.92 or more per month beginning with the first payment October 2, 
1981 and $1,363.92 on the 2nd day of each and every month thereafter; 
until on or before September 2, 1982 when the above mentioned balloon 
payment is due. Said monthly paynient applies to principal and interest 
only. 
At the time the above mentioned balloon payment is made, monthly payments 
on this Contract will be adjusted based on the then remaining balance 
amortzed over a fourteen (14) year period. 
In addition to said monthly payment, Buyer is to pay separately the 
annual real estate taxes and fire insurance premium promptly when same 
becomes due. 
It is mutually agreed that the Buyer may at her option make balloon 
payments in ^ny amount at ^ny time. Should Buyer elect to make balloon 
payments, the monthly payments on this Contract will be reduced and 
amortized over the remaining yean of this Contract. 
This Contract shall be amortized for fifteen (15) years. 
George'w". Barker, Jrt, Seller 
" " ) ' T . t V /"',- t /c <. : 
Lila M. Barker, Seller 
Of*he Hodge, ^uyer 
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Exhibit "Q" attached hereto and made a part of that Uniform Real Estate Contraqt 
by and between George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila M. Barker, his wife, as Seller arj 
Diane Hodge, as Buyer, dated August 28, 1981. 
BEGINNING at a point on an old fence line south 'l'U.Z6 feet and West 
796.69 feet from tne re-established Northeast Corner of Section 1U, 
Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point 
also being North 74°33* 15" East 207 feet and North 17°2r West 490.28 
feet and North 71°56' East 313.33 feet from a County Monument; ^nd 
running thence North 21°27' West 237.68 feet to the center of Spring 
Creek; thence North 68° East 90 feet along said Creek to a point on the 
boundary line described in that certain Quit-Claim Deed recorded in Book 
22U3, Page 488; thence South 25°30' East 245.5 feet along said boundary 
line; thence South 71°56' West 107.5 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TU ANO TOGETHER WITH a right of way described as follows: BEGINNING 
at a point South 787.42 feet and West 948.37 feet from the re-established 
Northeast corner of Section 10, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt 
Lake Meridian, said point also being North 74°33,15" East 207 feet from 
a County Monument, and running thence North 17°21' West 490.28 feet 
along an old fence line; thence North 71°56l East 313.31 feet along an 
old fence line to a point of 35 foot radius curve to the left; thence 
Northerly 146.61 feet around said curve to point of 3b foot radius curve 
to the right; thence Westerly 36.65 feet around said curve; thence South 
71°56' West 173.01 feet to a point of a fifty foot radius curve to the 
right; thence Westerly 27.74 feet around said curve to a point of 50 
foot radius reverse curve to the left; thence Westerly 105.66 feet 
around said curve to dn old fence line; thence South 17°21' East 489.23 
feet alony said fence to the center of a County Road; thence North 
74°33'15M East 23 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
Situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Together with pool table and one share Spring Creek Irrigation Water. 
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AMENDMENT TO UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, OATED AUGUST 28, 1981, 8Y ANO BETWEEN 
GEORGE W. BARKER, OR. ANO LILA M. DARKER, HIS WIFE, AS SELLER, ANO OIANE HODGE, 
AS BUYER. 
Effective November 30, 1981 the followinq chanqes are m full force and effect: 
Interest Rate: Ten and one-half per cent per annum (10.5%) 
Contract 8alance: $99,470.00 
Terms of Repayment: 
$1,104.65 or more per month beginninq with the first payment December 2, 1981 
and $1,104.65 or more on the 2nd day of each and every month thereafter until 
the entire principal balance toaether with accrued interest is paid in full. 
Said monthly payments apply to principal and interest only. In addition to 
said monthly payments the buyer is to pay seperately the annual real estate 
taxes and fire insurance premium promptly when same becomes due. 
It is mutually agreed that the Buyer may at her option make balloon payments, 
in any amount, at any time. Should Buyer elect to make balloon payments, the 
monthly payments on this contract will be reduced and amortized over the 
remaining years of this contract. 
Thi£_contract shall be amortized for^fjfteen (V&'years. ^ 
Witness ~ P V ^Reorflfe W. Barker, Jr., Seller 7 
Liljf M. Barker, Seller / 
mVflr^B nyltts 
DUne Hodae, Buyer rf 
' I <-
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